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WEAPONIZING EN BANC
NEAL DEVINS† & ALLISON ORR LARSEN‡
The federal courts of appeals embrace the ideal that judges are committed to ruleof-law norms, collegiality, and judicial independence. Whatever else divides them,
these judges generally agree that partisan identity has no place on the bench. Consequently, when a court of appeals sits “en banc,” (i.e., collectively) the party affiliations of the three-judge panel under review should not matter. Starting in the 1980s,
however, partisan ideology has grown increasingly important in the selection of
federal appellate judges. It thus stands to reason—and several high-profile modern
examples illustrate—that today’s en banc review could be used as a weapon by
whatever party has appointed the most judges on any particular circuit. A
weaponized en banc reflects more than just ideological differences between judges.
We define the phrase to capture a “team mentality” on the courts of appeals—an us
versus them—where the judges vote in blocs aligned with the party of the President
who appointed them and use en banc review to reverse panels composed of members from the other team.
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In this Article, we test whether en banc review is now or has ever been weaponized.
We make use of an original data set—the most comprehensive one of which we are
aware—that tracks en banc decisions over six decades. Our findings are surprising
in two very different ways. The bulk of our data indicates that rule-of-law norms
are deeply embedded. From the 1960s through 2017, en banc review seems to have
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developed some sort of immunity from partisan behavior over time, and we unpack
potential reasons why. But that important and long-lasting immunity could now be
in danger. Our data from 2018–2020 show a dramatic and statistically significant
surge in behavior consistent with the weaponizing of en banc review. It is too soon
to tell whether this is a temporary change or an inflection point indicating a more
permanent shift. We consider both possibilities and, in so doing, highlight the critical role that en banc review plays in ascertaining judicial commitment to rule-oflaw norms. The time may soon be upon us to confront the cost of en banc review in
a regime where party identity frequently trumps other judicial impulses.
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INTRODUCTION

1 Jess Bravin, No Obama or Trump Judges Here, Appointees of Both Declare, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-say-they-arent-extensions-ofpresidents-who-appointed-them-11568566598.
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Believers in an independent federal judiciary are battle-weary. A
familiar refrain used to comfort them is that partisanship, at least
among lower court judges, is not tolerated. As Judge Bibas of the
Third Circuit recently explained, “[w]e certainly are not viewing ourselves as members of teams or camps or parties. . . . My boss is not my
appointing president, my boss is the Constitution and the laws.”1 This

R
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view is pervasive among federal judges and legal scholars alike;2 it is
very much tied to judicial independence and the legitimacy of courts
generally.3 The idea is simple but powerful: even if judges have ideological preferences and methodological differences that continue to
separate them from one another, partisan loyalties fade away after
investiture to reveal a judiciary of men and women bound together by
collegiality norms and the rule of law.
This vital sentiment is being challenged regularly today. Most visibly, the incendiary vitriol that now dominates judicial confirmation
politics is a byproduct of the widely shared belief that there are indeed
“Trump judges” and “Obama judges.”4 Less obvious but perhaps
more telling, a team mentality could be emerging in the courts of
appeals and it is a dynamic most visible when the judges sit all
together in something called en banc review. Going en banc (as it is
said colloquially) generally means all active members of a U.S. court
of appeals sit together and make a decision for the circuit as a whole.5
This process mirrors the style of the U.S. Supreme Court: The judges
hear argument in a big room, often write separately, air disagreements
publicly, and authoritatively decide the law that will govern a large
jurisdiction for the foreseeable future.

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 4 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

2 See id. See generally Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins,
Eugene Lucci & Katherine Cheng, Ideology or Situation Sense? An Experimental
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349,
355 (2016) (concluding that “judges can in fact be expected to be neutral decision makers
in many politically charged cases” but noting that our current system of justice lacks
reliable practices for communicating such neutral resolutions to the public); Wendy L.
Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups (arguing that judicial decisions on collegial
courts are the product of group choices), in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 73 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
3 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
20–46 (2018); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Book Review: The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy
Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) [hereinafter Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma]
(reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
(2018)).
4 See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks
‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/
politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html (describing the politicization of the
judicial confirmation process).
5 The circuits vary somewhat in their rules for which judges sit en banc (senior judges,
judges sitting by designation, etc.). See Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 95 Stat. 1624
(noting that each court of appeals has its own rules for performing en banc review). Due to
its size, the Ninth Circuit rarely sits all together; rather, its en banc courts consist of the
Chief Judge and ten non-recused judges who are randomly drawn. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
For more on this variation and other important en banc observations, see Tracey E.
George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74
WASH. L. REV. 213, 231 (1999) (describing the Act of 1978 as “[t]he most recent evolution
in the en banc procedure” because Congress granted circuit courts “considerable leeway in
controlling the en banc process”).
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En banc decisions are rare, accounting for less than one percent
of appellate decisions, and they are uniquely awkward among judicial
acts.6 By definition, a judge sitting en banc is sitting in judgment of a
colleague on the same court.7 This makes it different from standard
vertical appellate review or even Supreme Court review of prior precedent. An en banc decision literally nullifies a prior decision made by
members of the same court—people you might pass in the lunchroom
later that day. Judges thus think of en banc proceedings as divisive and
unpleasant; some circuits even tout their low en banc rate as illustrative of a collegial and apolitical culture.8
Despite their rarity, en bancs deserve special scholarly attention.
En banc review is the one time when lower court judges have the
potential to truly line up in teams—all those appointed by Democrats
versus all those appointed by Republicans. En banc decisions thus
provide valuable and critical insight into the potential erosion of the
nonpartisan norm in federal judicial decision-making. And these days,
it is hard to ignore the warning signs of the en banc partisan team
spirit, especially on high visibility issues that divide the parties.
Consider the following recent example. When a lawsuit accusing
President Trump of violating the Constitution by accepting foreign
government money through his luxury hotels reached the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, it was randomly assigned to a panel of
judges all appointed by Republican Presidents. These three judges
decided that the lawsuit could not proceed.9 The entire Fourth Circuit,
however—comprised of judges the majority of whom were appointed
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 4 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

6 See Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L.
REV. 605, 608 (2020) (“The courts now review a mere 0.19% of decisions en banc, down
from 1.5% in 1964.”); Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2004 (2014) (“En banc hearings
consistently make up less than 1 percent of the caseload of the federal circuit courts.”).
7 See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUITS 189, 215–19 (1981) (“Group decision making thus ranks . . . as a major potential
limit on the personal discretion of circuit judges.”).
8 See Jon O. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint,
50 BROOK. L. REV. 365, 382 (1984) (“The Second Circuit’s self-discipline in holding to a
minimum the number of appeals reheard in banc is, in my view, a distinct benefit to the
court, the bar, and the development of the law.”). The Third Circuit also prizes itself on
collegiality and apparently—at least internally—goes by the nickname “the mighty Third.”
See James C. Martin, From the President’s Desk, ON APPEAL (Bar Ass’n for the Third Fed.
Cir., Brick, N.J.), Dec. 2010, at 1, 5.
9 In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 (4th Cir. 2019). The panel consisted of Judges
Niemeyer, Shedd, and Quattlebaum, who were appointed by Presidents Reagan, George
W. Bush, and Trump, respectively. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges,
1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search
(last visited June 13, 2021) (select “Republican” under the “Party of Appointing President”
tab).
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by Democrats—reversed the panel’s decision en banc.10 The ultimate
decision broke down entirely along party lines; all judges voted consistently with the ideology of their respective appointing presidents,
leading each side to make cutting accusations regarding the political
behavior of judges and the future of the rule of law, with Judge
Wilkinson complaining that they had all been reduced to “partisan
warriors.”11
Even the most optimistic believer in an independent non-partisan
judiciary would flinch at these events. It seems at least plausible that
the Fourth Circuit went en banc to bring in a renegade panel that
differed from the majority composition of the circuit as a whole: Put
bluntly, “You don’t speak for the Fourth Circuit. We speak for the
Fourth Circuit.”
There are several other recent en banc decisions that fit this
mold—from circuits dominated by judges appointed by Republicans
as well as by Democrats.12 Take the Fifth Circuit en banc decision
denying a remedy for a Mexican teenager shot at the border,13 the
D.C. Circuit en banc decision about whether an immigrant detainee
could have an abortion,14 and the Ninth Circuit decision regarding
whether children in deportation hearings have a right to counsel,15 to
name a few.
These headline-grabbing examples stood out to us as disturbing
on a very fundamental level. Partisan en bancs—by which we mean en
banc decisions that are more than ideologically divided but exhibit
my-party-versus-your-party warning signs—run counter to the core
notion of an independent judiciary.16 The federal courts of appeals

11/18/2021 14:12:20

In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
Id. at 287 n.6 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Compare id. at 289–90 (Wynn, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he public’s confidence and trust in the integrity of the judiciary suffer
greatly when judges who disagree with their colleagues’ view of the law accuse those
colleagues of abandoning their constitutional oath of office.”), with id. at 292 (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting) (“[W]e invite the judiciary to assemble along partisan lines in suits that seek
to enlist judges as partisan warriors in contradiction to the rule of law that is and should be
our first devotion.”).
12 For other recent examples, see infra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
13 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
14 Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (reinstating the district
court’s order requiring the government to grant access to an abortion).
15 C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (finding that certain indigent
children have a right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings).
16 We elaborate upon our measures for partisan behavior in Part III, infra, but in short,
we use two: (1) “partisan reversals” are instances in which a circuit dominated by
appointments from one party decides to reverse a panel composed of judges appointed by
the other party and (2) “partisan splits” are en banc decisions that divide the judges almost
entirely based on the party of the President who appointed them. We recognize, of course,
that the appointing President is not a perfect measure of partisanship, but it is a widely
11
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used measure by political scientists and we think it captures partisanship (not ideology) in
an important way.
17 Important examples include George, supra note 5; Michael E. Solimine, Ideology
and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1988); Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and
Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74
JUDICATURE 133 (1990); Micheal W. Giles, Thomas G. Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting
a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68
J. POL. 852 (2006) [hereinafter Giles et al., Setting a Judicial Agenda].
18 For helpful prior work on specific circuits and specific time periods, see Tom S.
Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (2008);
CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT (1999); Susan B. Haire,
Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal
Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 (2003); Note, The Politics
of En Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1989).
19 We collected and coded cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. We left the Federal Circuit out
of our study because it differs from the other circuits in terms of its docket and its function.

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 5 Side B

make use of a randomly-assigned three-judge panel system precisely
because any group of three (whatever their partisan affiliation) is seen
as able to render justice in any case and therefore the equal of any
other group of three. Partisan en bancs, however, present the possibility that cases are resolved not because of disagreements on the law
or even diverging ideological priors, but because one side can outmuscle the other side. Judge Wilkinson’s warning about “partisan warriors” is chilling. It starkly invokes the fear that courts will become
simple power brokers. It is very difficult to agree with Chief Justice
Roberts that there are no “Trump judges” or “Obama judges” if
appellate judges use en banc review as a weapon against each other
when they have the numbers to do so.
And so we set out on a quest to dig into the en banc tool and its
history in order to determine if en banc decision-making is being used
in this “partisan warrior” way—and whether that use is new.
Although legal scholars and political scientists have written on en
banc decision-making generally,17 relatively little has been said about
the partisan dimensions of going en banc and nobody has comprehensively studied that dynamic over time.18 We quickly discovered that
what we wanted—a large collection of en banc decisions from every
circuit over generations—did not yet exist (and that Westlaw,
LexisNexis, and other search engines did not formally separate en
banc cases from other decisions).
We thus assembled what we believe to be the most comprehensive en banc database to date. We gathered en banc decisions from
twelve circuits (all circuits except the Federal Circuit) for three-year
periods over the last fifty-five years: 1966–1968, 1976–1978,
1986–1988, 1996–1998, 2006–2008, and 2016–2018.19 We then additionally tracked and coded en banc decisions from 2019–2020 so we
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For additional discussion of our research methodology, see infra notes 149–52 and
accompanying text.
20 The methodology to identify these cases is described fully in Part III. See infra note
149 and accompanying text; see also supra note 19 and accompannying text.
21 The rise of partisan en bancs in the 1980s may also be attributed to a dramatic sixtythree percent increase in federal appeals judgeships from 1978–1984. See infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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could take a harder look at the Trump era to see whether it fit the
pattern or was an outlier. Using primarily a combination of Westlaw
research and data from the Federal Judicial Center, our research identified 952 en banc decisions sampled over fifty-four years.20 This was a
heavy research lift, but it was the only way to use a long lens and
explore the changes to partisan en bancs over time—a question critical to the current existential debate about the judicial independence
of federal courts.
What we found surprised us. With the above anecdotal examples
in mind, we fully expected to find a connection between the evergrowing ideological polarization since 1980 and evidence of “en banc
as a partisan weapon,” by which we mean the willingness of a circuit
to check renegade panels that differ from the composition of the court
as a whole based on appointing President (a “partisan reversal”), and/
or en banc decisions in which judges vote as a team consistent with the
party of the President who appointed them (a “partisan split”). Perhaps most importantly, we also expected to see these patterns align
over time with pre-documented periods of polarization, which has
grown at a steady clip from the post-Reagan period to today.
What we did find, however, was far more complicated than what
our hypothesis suggested. We were correct in our guess that there
would be next to no evidence of partisan en banc decision-making in
the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting the lack of a significant ideological
divide between Democrats and Republicans at that time. And we
were likewise correct in our hunch that partisan en bancs would make
their first real appearance in the 1980s.21 But we were wrong in our
prediction of what would come next. Our data largely show stability
and a lack of partisan en banc behavior from the end of the Reagan
administration to the start of the Trump administration. Of course,
there was some variance from circuit to circuit—a variance we plan to
explore in a subsequent paper. Our expectation, however, was to find
a general increasing trend of partisan splits and partisan reversals
nationally across time starting in the 1980s, and that expectation was
not met.
Instead, our data from the 1990s, 2000s, and much of the 2010s
reveal that partisanship occasionally plays a role in en banc decisions,
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22 It is possible, of course, that judges might vote to go en banc for ideological reasons
related to suspicion of the panel’s leanings, but when they do vote at the en banc stage,
other factors outweigh those ideological considerations. But since there is no consistent
record of which judges vote to rehear a case en banc (let alone a record of the reasons why
they vote to go en banc) it is very difficult to analyze how partisanship enters into the
decision to grant en banc review. For that reason, our study focuses only on the cases
where the circuits do go en banc. For additional discussion, see infra note 152 and
accompanying text.

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 6 Side B

but not usually and not in any predictable pattern.22 These results hold
true even for constitutional cases, which we used as a proxy for cases
that one might consider “high profile.” While we did find more partisan behavior in constitutional en banc decisions, partisan splits
within that set of cases hovered at around only nineteen percent of all
en banc decisions and partisan reversals stayed around seventeen percent. This is far less than our hypothesis predicted and runs counter to
the pattern we thought we would see over time.
Thus, the long view suggests an encouraging story. Significant
forces seem to be pushing against the en banc partisan impulse—
forces like rule-of-law norms, collegiality, and judicial independence.
These norms seem particularly well-entrenched and durable in en
banc decision-making. The bulk of our data thus highlights a hopeful
note in the debate about judicial independence. There are institutionalized incentives and norms pushing courts to act like courts, notwithstanding polarization and the growing ideological divide in judicial
appointments and panel decisions. Once a person takes the oath, dons
the robe, and speaks as a “we” with colleagues across time and ideology, she becomes bound by different norms and seems to behave in
a way that celebrates the customs of the courts, collegiality, and the
desire not to appear partisan.
But there is also reason to suspect we are living in a moment of
change. From 2018–2020 there was a dramatic and strongly statistically significant spike in both partisan splits and partisan reversals of
en banc decisions—more in both categories than we observed in any
other time period over six decades. While the rate of going en banc
did not change, the level of partisan intensity in the en banc decisions
issued did change—at least as reflected by the significantly increased
number of partisan splits and partisan reversals. This Trump-era
uptick is very striking and calls into question the persistence of norms
pushing against partisan judging. Almost 35% of en banc decisions in
2018–2020 involved either a partisan reversal or partisan split. Compare this to 16% in 2016–2017, 19% in 2006–2008, and 20% in
1996–1998. This dwarfs even the previous high point of partisanship
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See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
Then-candidate Joe Biden promised both a “return to normalcy” and a commitment
to appointing progressive judges. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
24
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we observed in 1986–1988, which amounted to 25% of all en banc
decisions.
Significantly, weaponizing en banc seems to be on the rise in circuits dominated by judges appointed by Democrats, as well as in those
dominated by judges appointed by Republicans. For their part, the
political parties have backed this kind of us-them partisanship: The
Republican Policy Committee formally embraced weaponizing en
banc review in 2019, while the 2020 Democratic Party Platform
included increasing federal courts of appeals judgeships as a way of
counterbalancing Trump judicial appointments.23
What does this mean? Are we at an inflection point where partisan forces are so strong and divisive that appellate courts are more
likely to go en banc as a partisan weapon, whatever the costs? Are
judges appointed today somehow different in terms of their resistance
to using en banc review in this partisan way? One day will we say
President Trump changed the face of appellate decision-making and
quelled the forces of collegiality that up to this point seemed to dominate en banc review? Or will President Biden’s promised “return to
normalcy” reinvigorate those forces?24 For reasons we will detail, it is
simply too soon to draw definitive conclusions. What we can show is
that the costs of en banc review devolving into straightforward partisan politics are great—so great that there is reason to question the
continuing use of en banc review if the Trump-era pattern persists.
Consequently, the historically entrenched en banc forces we unpack in
this article are all the more vital to assess.
Part I of this Article explains why en banc decision-making is a
particularly valuable lens to study the persistence of rule-of-law norms
such as judicial independence and collegiality. It briefly describes the
history of en banc review and prior studies of the political dynamics
involved. Part II tracks the rise of the partisan ideological divide
within the federal courts of appeals and explains why we speculated
that the use of en banc review as a partisan weapon would increase
over time as polarization also increased. Part III describes our data
and what we did find: the absence of this suspected uptick in partisan
behavior, at least until very recently, and then a concerning spike in it
from 2018–2020. And finally, Parts IV and V discuss implications of
our discoveries. Part IV details the forces at work that seem historically to resist the use of en banc review as a weapon. Part V tries to
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make sense of the Trump-era uptick and, with it, assesses what could
be lost if we are in fact at a point of no return.

WHY STUDY

I
EN BANCS? HISTORY & PRIOR STUDIES

25

11/18/2021 14:12:20

See Copus, supra note 6, at 608.
See BANKS, supra note 18, at 91 (noting that “[t]he existence of en banc jurisdiction
. . . is the result of a historical accident” and was never contemplated to be part of Article
III judging).
27 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 255,
255–303 (2013) (analyzing “dissent aversion,” when “a judge [opts] not to dissent even
when he disagrees with the decision,” and noting that there are several factors at play that
influence the final decision).
28 En banc review is also an important bridge between federal courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court. En banc cases are “inherently more significant” and “serve[] as a signal”
to the Supreme Court and are therefore far more likely to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of Courts of
Appeals En Banc, 9 S. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 197 (2001).
26
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En banc review is an unusual feature of judicial decisionmaking.25 It is rarely used and some say it was never even meant to be
part of Article III decision-making below the Supreme Court.26 When
judges sit en banc, they are literally sitting for the purpose of evaluating one another; an en banc decision typically vacates a prior decision from a panel of judges on the same court. Only federal courts of
appeals judges are asked to review their colleagues this way. It is
unpleasant and often contentious business. Its rarity, moreover, amplifies its significance. All aspects of en banc decision-making are
unique—the decision to go en banc, the nature of the oral arguments,
and the prevalence of dissenting opinions, just to name a few.27 Put
simply, judges interface with each other in fundamentally different
ways throughout the en banc process.
En banc decisions, therefore, give us unique insight into the selfimage of the federal appellate courts, that is, what these judges see
their role to be: Are they judges who, while often disagreeing with
each other, are still jointly committed to an independent judiciary, or
are courts just another casualty of partisan polarization in which
judges line up in teams and fight it out?28 This existential question into
the very soul of the federal courts deserves a historical lens. We thus
undertake a brief tour of the history of en banc and its study by political scientists before unpacking what we found in our longitudinal
exploration.
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The History of En Banc Review

Intermediate appellate courts began in earnest (outside of justices riding circuit) with the Evarts Act of 1891, a statute passed in
light of an increased federal court caseload after the Civil War.29 The
law established three-judge panels for intermediate appellate review
but relied heavily on judges from the district courts and Supreme
Court to staff those panels.30 Neither the Evarts Act nor the subsequent 1911 Judicial Code31 endorsed en banc decision-making, but
they did not forbid it either.
The first example of an en banc decision from a U.S. court of
appeals came from the Third Circuit in 1941 shortly after that court
grew beyond three full-time members.32 The court resolved the ambiguity in the Evarts Act by reasoning that “each of the five circuit
judges was a member of the court, that the court must comprise all of
its members, and that the power to decide a case through a panel of
three judges did not deprive the full court of the power to decide the
case,” and the Supreme Court affirmed the soundness of that reasoning on review.33
The authority to go en banc was recognized officially by Congress
in 1948 and now derives from Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (FRAP).34 Rule 35 explains that en banc review
is “not favored” but is allowed in two limited circumstances: when
“(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”35
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 8 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

29 Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Before the Civil War, appellate courts had no
real separate identity. They were staffed by Supreme Court justices riding circuit. See
Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-Supreme Court,” 13
J.L. & POL. 377, 379 n.16 (1997) (describing the history of en banc review). Following the
Civil War, plaintiffs began to bring more cases in the federal court system, putting strain on
a system that had not been comprehensively reorganized since the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789. Id.
30 See George, supra note 5, at 223.
31 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
32 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1010 (1991) (describing Comm’r v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d
62 (3d Cir. 1940)). The Ninth Circuit contemplated the power to sit en banc even earlier,
but decided that they did not have the power to do so. See George, supra note 5, at 227–28
(referencing Lang’s Estate v. Comm’r, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938), in which a Ninth Circuit
panel asked the Supreme Court to resolve a conflict between its decision and that of a
previous panel on the same issue, rather than overturn the previous panel itself).
33 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, at 1010–11 (describing Comm’r v. Textile Mills Sec.
Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), aff’d, 314 U.S. 326 (1941)).
34 See BANKS, supra note 18, at 94–95; George, supra note 5, at 229.
35 FED. R. APP. P. 35; see also Solimine, supra note 17, at 34–35 (“In the wake of rule
35, each circuit has repromulgated rules and procedures to govern both litigant and judicial
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The first reason to go en banc—clearing up intra-circuit splits—is
the one historically considered and traditionally emphasized by judges
as the “primary” reason to go en banc.36 The general judicial sentiment is that going en banc is a housekeeping chore, or in the colorful
words of one judge, “the truth is that most circuit judges regard en
bancs as a ‘damned nuisance.’ ”37
Indeed, there are plenty of judges on record stating that striving
for uniformity within a circuit (the clean-up rationale) is the only
reason to go en banc. Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit, for
example, explained that “it is not the purpose of the en banc process
to assure that cases are decided in the way the majority of the whole
court would have decided them.”38 And Judge Newman of the Second
Circuit emphasized that en banc decisions outside of the housekeeping function should involve questions, as Rule 35 states, of
“exceptional importance.”39
The second reason that en banc decisions are authorized—to
answer questions of exceptional importance—is the rationale that
gives rise to potential partisan dynamics. Judge Frank Coffin of the
First Circuit once said that courts sitting en banc “resemble a small
legislature more than a court.”40 Although using en banc review to
answer important questions has always had its champions,41 it is a

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 8 Side B
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procedures for determining whether a panel decision should be en banced. The circuit rules
largely replicate the language in rule 35 and do not provide greater specificity regarding
the substantive criteria.”).
36 George, supra note 5, at 234 n.112; see also Neil D. McFeeley, En Banc Proceedings
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 255, 261 (1987) (“The major
reason for the existence of en banc rehearings is to ensure intra-circuit consistency.”).
37 HOWARD, supra note 7, at 217.
38 Arthur D. Hellman, “The Law of the Circuit” Revisited: What Role for Majority
Rule?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 625, 626 (2008) [hereinafter Hellman, Majority Rule] (quoting
Judge James R. Browning, Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States, 106 F.R.D. 103, 162 (1984)).
39 Newman, supra note 8, at 386. But cf. A. Lamar Alexander Jr., Note, En Banc
Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities
(Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 590 (1965) (“[T]he propriety of using ‘importance’ as an
independent reason for considering a case en banc is questionable.”); id. at 578 (“[E]n banc
proceedings are sometimes the only appropriate method of dealing with serious intracircuit conflict.”).
40 FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 5 (1994).
41 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425, 430 (2000) (“Justice
Scalia wrote: ‘[T]he function of en banc hearings . . . is not only to eliminate intra-circuit
conflicts, but also to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly wrong.’”);
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, at 1034 (“[T]he majority should rule.”); Hellman, Majority
Rule, supra note 38, at 626 (quoting a commission chaired by Supreme Court Justice Byron
White as saying “issues of exceptional importance will be determined by all [of] the judges
for whom the decision speaks” (citing COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 51 (1998))); see also Sadinsky, supra
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move that has gained popularity in recent years. By the year 2000,
according to one count, “the importance cases [had] eclipsed the uniformity cases as the primary justification for en banc scrutiny.”42
As en banc decisions on questions of national importance grew,
so too did the warnings that going en banc for this reason can lead to
“everything that is supposedly wrong with courts.”43 As political scientist Christopher Banks explains, “[s]ince granting en banc review is
at bottom an exercise of raw judicial discretion, the decision to meet
as one can be politically manipulated by a majority of result-oriented
judges in active service.”44 Justice Harry Blackmun put it memorably
when talking to the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference: “[W]hen I see
in en banc hearings, all the appointees of the present administration
voting one way and all the appointees of prior administrations,
Democrat or Republican, voting the other way. I am a little bit concerned. Maybe I am more than a little bit concerned.”45
B.

Prior Studies and Recent Examples

11/18/2021 14:12:20

note 6, at 2017–18 (noting that it is more cost-effective for smaller courts, like the First
Circuit, to hold en banc hearings or rehearing as compared to larger courts).
42 Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit: An Empirical Study, 19902000, 68 TENN. L. REV. 771, 782–83 (2001); see also Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, at
1051 (“Sometimes the court must convene en banc because that is the only way to maintain
uniformity in the law. More often it is because the case involves a question of exceptional
importance to the public, to the court, or to the parties, and a majority think that the panel
probably erred.”).
43 BANKS, supra note 18, at 98.
44 Id. at 90; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1680 (2003) (“In an uncollegial environment at its worst,
decisions to rehear cases en banc can result in disastrous judicial decision making—
ideologically driven and result-oriented.”).
45 George, supra note 5, at 241 (quoting Justice Harry Blackmun, Address at the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference, St. Louis, Mo., at 01:04:18 (July 23,
1988), https://www.c-span.org/video/?3581-1/supreme-court-justices-harry-blackmun.
46 Banks, supra note 29, at 405 (discussing the Ginsburg & Falk study).
47 Id.; Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, app. at 1054.
48 Smith, supra note 17, at 137.
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Prior studies to test this political dynamic have found cause for
Blackmun’s concern. For example, a study of the D.C. Circuit in the
1980s by D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg (with Donald Falk)
found plenty of “conflict and disharmony” in en banc decisions.46 Of
sixty-one cases, only sixteen were unanimously decided, and six of the
non-unanimous cases were decided by just one vote.47 Similarly,
Professor Chris Smith found partisan splits in his study of all circuit
court en banc decisions in the 1980s.48 Smith looked at nonunanimous en banc decisions and categorized which were polarized—
meaning, in his terms, which resolved with a bloc of Reagan
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appointees on one side against the rest of the court.49 The results
showed that polarization was more evident in circuits with more
Reagan appointees, such as the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit,
and that there were more polarized decisions as Reagan filled more
vacancies across the courts of appeals.50
In 1999, Professor Tracey George was one of the first to test
empirically why circuit courts went en banc.51 She compared 305 cases
heard en banc by three circuits with a random sample of cases from
those same circuits that were not reheard en banc.52 Professor George
endorsed a “hybrid” multifarious theory for why courts go en banc.53
It was true, she found, that appellate judges went en banc for housekeeping reasons (to resolve splits), but it was also true that the ideological direction of a panel’s decision, particularly when it was liberal,
was strongly correlated with the court’s decision to grant en banc
review.54
Other studies of particular circuits or particular time periods confirm that there is some indication of ideological behavior in en banc
decisions. Political scientist Tom Clark looked at en banc decisions
from every circuit from 1986 to 1996.55 He found statistically signifi49

Id. at 135–37.
Id. at 137. For a contrary view of lopsided en banc voting, see Professor Michael
Solimine’s 1988 study in which he found little cause for concern, supra note 17, at 33 (“The
study finds only a handful of cases in which Reagan-appointed judges alone provided the
votes necessary to overturn a disfavored panel decision.”).
51 George, supra note 5, at 216 (“Surprisingly little is known about why circuit courts
select certain cases for en banc rehearing.”). For a detailing of the reasons circuit judges
offer each other in favor of or against going en banc, see Stephen L. Wasby, Why Sit En
Banc?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 747 (2012).
52 The circuits Professor George examined were the Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits, from 1956 to 1996. See George, supra note 5, at 250. In prior work, Professor
George also studied the Fourth Circuit extensively from 1962 to 1996 and found a clear
pattern of ideological voting. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1670 (1998).
53 George, supra note 5, at 219. Ultimately, Professor George concluded that there are
three factors which largely account for the cases that go en banc: (1) when a panel has
reversed a lower court, (2) when a panel judge dissents, and (3) when the ruling of the
panel is liberal. See id. at 219–20.
54 Id. at 256–57. More recently, in 2006, Professor Michael Giles—studying the Fifth
Circuit in the 1980s—also found that the decision to go en banc was a complicated one. See
Giles et al., Setting a Judicial Agenda, supra note 17, at 865. Ultimately, Giles concluded,
like Professor George, that the decision to go en banc could not be neatly labeled: “[T]he
final vote to grant or deny a full-court rehearing exhibits relatively little in the way of
systematic variation.” Id. at 864.
55 Clark, supra note 18. In addition to studying different time periods, Clark’s
important study differs from ours in another respect: his focus was on ideological divisions,
not partisan identity and, as such, he grouped together ideologically simpatico Republicans
and Democrats, whereas we focus on the growing partisan divide.
50

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 9 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 10 Side A

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU501.txt

November 2021]

unknown

Seq: 15

WEAPONIZING EN BANC

18-NOV-21

14:02

1387

cant results indicating some use of en banc as a weapon.56 When, for
example, a panel that was more liberal than the full circuit made a
conservative decision, it was not likely to be reheard en banc; but if
the panel made a liberal decision, conforming to its perceived bias
(what Clark labeled an “ideological disposition”), it was more likely to
be reheard en banc.57 In fact, Clark observed, the chances of an ideological decision being reheard increased as the ideological distance
between a panel and the full circuit increased.58
These prior studies helped inform our instinct that en banc review
could be used as a partisan weapon in the courts of appeals, but they
stopped short of answering our ultimate long-view question. Because
these studies considered either only a few circuits or only a specific
moment in time (generally the 1980s), they could not speak to the big
picture: whether en banc review has always been used as a partisan
weapon nationwide, or whether we were witnessing something new or
something regional.59
And it is no mystery what sparked our interest in the question.
Over the past few years, partisan en banc showdowns peppered newspaper headlines with some regularity. From 2018 to 2020, a Westlaw
search of “en banc” reveals that newspapers throughout the country
covered these partisan en banc fights far more than in previous time
periods.60 In so doing, as has now become routine, reporters labeled

56
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Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 62.
58 Id. For a similar example, focused on the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in the year 1995
to 1996, see Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology
on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157, 159 (2000) (finding that panel
decisions he classified as “liberal” were reheard more often by the en banc court). See also
Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, Christopher Zorn & Todd C. Peppers, The
Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 449
(2007) [hereinafter Giles et al., Etiology] (arguing that ideology has long influenced the
decision to go en banc).
59 Generalizations regarding partisanship in the 1980s are also complicated by the sixtythree percent growth in the number of federal appeals judgeships from 1978 to 1984. See
infra note 75. Moreover, 1980s studies are not uniform in their conclusions regarding
partisanship. See supra note 54.
60 From 2018 to the beginning of 2021, en banc decision-making was featured in fortytwo news stories from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Boston Globe, The
Chicago Tribune, The Houston Chronicle, The Los Angeles Times, and The Philadelphia
Inquirer. See Memorandum from Canaan Suitt to Neal Devins and Allison Orr Larsen,
Newspaper Coverage of En Banc Decisions (Jan. 11, 2021) (on file with authors). A similar
search of those papers in earlier decades revealed far less interest in en banc decisionmaking: two from 1966 to 1968, three from 1976 to 1978, two from 1986 to 1988, twentyseven from 1996 to 1998, and eleven from 2006 to 2008. See id.
57
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the federal circuits “Democratic” or “Republican” when deciding the
high stakes issues that divide the parties.61
Most familiar, perhaps, are the cases addressing what could be
called the personal Trump docket—that is, decisions in which
President Trump was personally invested, in more than just a
defending-policy kind of way. Examples include the D.C. Circuit decision denying relief to former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn
(an en banc decision that reversed a panel composed of Trump
appointed judges)62 or a similar en banc move in the Don McGahn
subpoena litigation.63 Likewise, party line voting was on display when
the Fourth Circuit ruled en banc against the President in both the
emoluments clause litigation64 and a 2018 challenge to President
Trump’s travel ban (a decision that quite unusually bypassed the three
judge panel).65
But examples of partisan warfare in recent en bancs are not limited to the Trump docket, nor can they easily be labeled as part of
Democratic “resistance.” Indeed, partisan en banc reversals and partisan en banc splits arise in circuits dominated by Democrat
appointees as well as by Republican ones, and in cases covering a wide
variety of issues.
For example, in the Sixth Circuit, where the majority of the
judges were appointed by Republicans, a panel of three judges held in
2020 that the Fourteenth Amendment protected a fundamental right
to a “basic minimum education” and that right was being violated by
Detroit public schools.66 The panel in that case was comprised of two
Democrat-appointed judges and one Trump appointee, who dis43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 10 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

61 For 2020 examples of reporters focusing on the political affiliations of appeals judges,
see Sharon LaFraniere, Appeals Court Allows Emoluments Suit Against Trump to Proceed,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/us/politics/trumpemoluments-clause-fourth-circuit.html; Jacob Gershman, Federal Court Says Florida
Felons Can’t Vote Until They Pay Fines, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/federal-court-says-florida-felons-cant-vote-until-they-pay-fines-11599849285;
Maura Dolan, Trump Has Flipped the 9th Circuit—And Some New Judges Are Causing a
‘Shock Wave,’ L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202002-22/trump-conservative-judges-9th-circuit.
62 In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
63 Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d
755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
64 In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
65 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
banc). Another recent partisan en banc ruling from the Fourth Circuit is Wise v. Circosta,
978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc), a 2020 decision regarding ballot extension disputes in
North Carolina. In this case, the Fourth Circuit took the unusual step of taking the case en
banc after the panel had voted but before the panel opinion had been drafted. Id. at 117
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
66 Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2020).
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sented;67 it is an example of what we call a “renegade panel,” where
the panel’s partisan composition differs from the composition of the
circuit as a whole.68 Sure enough, several months later the entire Sixth
Circuit, the majority of whom were appointed by Republicans, voted
sua sponte to take the case en banc even after being apprised that the
parties had reached a settlement.69 The en banc court vacated the
prior panel opinion, nullifying the work of the panel, and then dismissed the case as moot due to the settlement.70 Other examples of
strictly party-line en banc rulings include a September 2020 Eleventh
Circuit ruling upholding limits on felon voting in Florida71 and a May
2020 Seventh Circuit decision holding a Wisconsin county liable for
allowing a male guard to sexually assault female inmates.72
Moreover—and significantly—the tone of many of these recent
en banc decisions is devolving into my-team-your-team accusations. In
a particularly contentious 2019 en banc decision from the Fourth
Circuit concerning Virginia’s habitual drunkard law, for example, the
judicial gloves came off to reveal accusations of partisan behavior,
leading Judge Keenan to bemoan that they had lost their “cherished
tradition of civility.”73 Similarly, a December 2020 article revealed dis-
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67 Id. at 620; see also FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 9 (select “Sixth Circuit” under the
“Court” tab).
68 Partisan behavior can also manifest itself when a court of appeals refuses to hear a
case en banc, typically in circuits where the three-judge panel and circuit majority come
from the same political party. Recent examples of this dynamic come from the Second,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in cases involving sanctuary cities, see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020), reh’g denied, 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) (en banc); a
transgender prisoner’s right to sex-reassignment surgery, see Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935
F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); and the
Obamacare severability case, see Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2019) (mem.) (en banc). Another recent Ninth Circuit en
banc denial, involving immigration, prompted a stinging dissent from twelve of the circuit’s
thirteen Republican judges, effectively accusing the Democratic majority of manipulating
the Circuit’s unique en banc process. See William Yeatman, Ninth Circuit ReviewReviewed: Is CA9’s En Banc Process Driving Disagreement?, YALE J. REG. (Dec. 10,
2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/ninth-circuit-review-reviewed-is-ca9s-en-banc-processdriving-disagreement-by-william-yeatman (discussing Vega-Anguiano v. Barr, 942 F.3d 945
(9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 982 F.3d 542 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)).
69 See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216, 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem.) (en banc); Colter
Paulson, Sixth Circuit Vacates Right-to-Literacy Ruling, NAT’L L. REV. (June 11, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sixth-circuit-vacates-right-to-literacy-ruling.
70 See Gary B., 958 F.3d at 1216 (vacating panel’s decision); Gary B. v. Whitmer, Nos.
18-1855, 18-1871, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312, at *10 (6th Cir. June 10, 2020) (mem.) (en
banc) (dismissing case as moot).
71 Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
72 J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
73 Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Keenan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Circuit echoed the same attitude one year later in a partisan en
banc decision invalidating predictive policing in high-crime areas. See United States v.
Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 315–16 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Tempers flared as a judge in the
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cord at a new level among the Ninth Circuit judges and voiced concern that en banc review there had “become a driver of dysfunction
and disharmony.”74
Aware both of the seeming rise of partisan en banc rulings and
the limits of earlier studies, we set out on a quest for the big picture of
en banc review. No previous study looked at changes in en banc
review over decades for all the circuits. By considering only one or
two circuits, these studies do not take into account differences in the
dockets and practices of the circuits. And no previous study considered the possible connection of rising party polarization and partisan
en banc decision-making.75 We thus assembled the most comprehensive en banc database of which we are aware, covering 952 decisions
across six decades and from twelve circuits.76 We wanted to know
whether judges were changing over time in their use of the en banc
mechanism. And, more specifically, we were suspicious that
weaponizing en banc would rise as polarization in the politics of judicial appointments increased.

OUR

II
HYPOTHESIS: EN BANC

AS A

WEAPON?

We thought en banc review over time would track the rise of
polarization elsewhere. We were wrong. In understanding the implications of what we did find over time, it is necessary to understand the
rise of polarization and its impact on the appointment and decision-
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majority accused the dissent of “writ[ing] today with a smooth pen and a tin ear.” Id. at 344
(Thacker, J., concurring); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 4th Circuit Spars Over Predictive
Policing, A.B.A. J. (July 16, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/4thcircuit-spars-over-policing-dissenter-said-to-write-with-a-smooth-pen-and-a-tin-ear. For
more on the Fourth Circuit and the implications of the tone of the discourse, see H.
Jefferson Powell, Judges as Superheroes: The Danger of Confusing Constitutional Decisions
with Cosmic Battles, 72 S.C. L. REV. 917 (2021).
74 Yeatman, supra note 68.
75 By largely focusing on partisanship in the 1980s, moreover, earlier studies do not
consider whether 1980s decision-making is representative. More to the point,
generalizations regarding partisanship in the 1980s are complicated by the sixty-three
percent growth in the number of federal appeals judgeships from 1978 to 1984. See U.S.
Courts of Appeals: Additional Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/appealsauth.pdf (last visited June 13, 2021) (noting that ninety-three total
appeals court judgeships existed before 1978 and that fifty-nine additional judgeships were
authorized between 1978 and 1984).
76 Another limit on the prior studies that we quickly encountered was the difficulty in
actually finding all en banc decisions in the first place. Because many en banc cases are not
labeled “en banc” or are not labeled in a place that is easy to find, there is no quick way to
collect them all; Westlaw alone is insufficient. Thus another advantage to the database we
assembled is that we are the first to use a three-part method to gather en banc decisions
from both the Westlaw database, the Federal Judicial Center, and from citations in
subsequent opinions. See infra Part III and notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
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making of federal judges. In other words, the implications of our
thwarted hypothesis are lost without understanding where our hunch
came from. Evaluating the linkage between partisanship and en banc
review requires a solid foundational understanding of partisan
dynamics as they relate to judicial decision-making, so it is to that history that we now turn.
A.

Federal Judicial Appointments Before Ronald Reagan

11/18/2021 14:12:20

77 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned
the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 331–33, 337–38 (2017)
[hereinafter Devins & Baum, Split Definitive].
78 See NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 105 (2019) [hereinafter DEVINS & BAUM,
COMPANY] (noting that, in 1968, liberal Republicans existed and Democrats ran the
ideological gamut).
79 See Tara Leigh Grove, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 1555, 1572–74 (2021) (observing that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
deferred to the preferences of home-state Democratic Senators and appointed
segregationists).
80 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 114–15 tbl.6-1
(2006).
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Before the election of Ronald Reagan, ideology was simply not
the controlling factor in federal judicial appointments. Presidents,
instead, gave principal attention to other considerations, such as
rewarding political allies, appealing to voters, and avoiding confirmation battles in the Senate.77 This was true, of course, not just with
appointments to the Supreme Court, but in the lower courts as well.
From 1945 to 1968, Democratic Presidents saw no political gain in
linking party to ideology for judicial appointments. Liberal
“Rockefeller Republicans” were important to the Republican party
and the Democratic base was then a hodgepodge that included
Northern liberals and Southern conservatives.78 When appointing
lower court judges in states subject to school desegregation lawsuits,
for example, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson appointed both integrationists and segregationists.79 Reflecting the limited salience of ideology during this time, President Eisenhower’s appointees to the
federal courts of appeals cast a near identical percentage of liberal
votes (fifty-six percent) as did President Kennedy’s appointees (fiftynine percent) and President Johnson’s appointees (fifty-nine
percent).80
Appointments to the federal courts of appeals by Presidents
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford further highlight the limited salience
of ideology before President Reagan. President Nixon sought to woo
conservatives opposed to criminal justice reforms and school bussing;
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at the same time, he was careful not to alienate northern liberals who
were still a key part of the Republican coalition.81 “[P]olitics far more
than ideology” drove President Nixon’s decision to appoint moderates.82 A ranking of liberal votes cast by federal court of appeals
judges between 1952 and 2008 places President Nixon’s appointees
(forty-six percent) and President Ford’s appointees (forty-four percent) smack in the middle—closer to President Bill Clinton’s
appointees (forty-eight percent) than to appointees of Republican
Presidents Ronald Reagan (thirty-nine percent), George H.W. Bush
(thirty-six percent), and George W. Bush (thirty-eight percent).83
More telling, there was little opportunity for a significant partisan
divide to emerge in the period before President Reagan. Studies of
roll call votes in Congress show that there was next to no ideological
difference between congressional Democrats and Republicans from
1930 to 1980.84 Democrats and Republicans alike occupied every ideological niche and there was a significant cohort of moderates.85
Further, under the norm of senatorial courtesy, home-state
Senators from the President’s political party were instrumental in judicial appointments and most judicial nominations were quickly
approved with broad bipartisan support.86 For example, from 1945 to
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81 See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL
LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 2–3, 7–8 (2011) (noting that President
Nixon did not expect complete ideological loyalty even from his Supreme Court nominees
on those issues of criminal justice and school desegregation).
82 Id. at 6. Of President Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointments, William Rehnquist
stood alone as a strong conservative. See id. (observing that President Nixon’s other three
appointees—Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell—were more moderate).
83 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 114–15 tbl.6-1. President Jimmy Carter’s court of
appeals nominees cast liberal votes fifty-four percent of the time. Id.
84 See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 30–31 figs.2.8 & 2.9 (2006)
(showing high ideological overlap between parties in both the House and Senate from the
Great Depression through the mid-1980s and declining thereafter).
85 See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 26 (2008) (noting
that, in the 93rd Congress of 1973 to 1974, “95 percent of Republicans were more liberal
than the most conservative Democrat, and 36 percent of Democrats were more
conservative than the most liberal Republican”); see also Steven S. Smith & Gerald
Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
141, 147 fig.7-2, 151 fig.7-4 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009)
(showing very low differences in ideological scores between the two parties from 1937 to
1977, measured by legislators’ roll-call voting records in Congress).
86 See Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice and Consent During the Bush Years:
The Politics of Confirming Federal Judges, JUDICATURE, May–June 2009, at 320, 324–25,
325 figs.3A & 3B (showing that confirmation processes from 1947 to 1987 were typically
much shorter than confirmation processes from 1987 onwards). When there was no homestate Senator from the President’s party, high ranking state officials from the President’s
party would play a role in the selection of federal courts of appeals judges. See SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
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1980, the confirmation rate for presidential nominations to the federal
circuit courts ranged from approximately eighty to ninety-five
percent.87
B.

The Reagan Revolution

Everything started to change in 1981. By reaching out to conservative Southern Democrats and abandoning moderate-to-liberal
“Rockefeller Republicans,” the raison-d’etre of “Ronald Reagan’s
GOP” was to emphasize ideological divisions between the parties.88
Accordingly, the Reagan administration made ideological considerations “the most important criteria” in the screening of judicial candidates.89 Critical of the Nixon and Ford administrations’ appointment
of Democrats to the federal bench and their related failure to take
account of the “philosophical grounding” of judicial candidates,90 the
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THROUGH REAGAN 134–35 (1997) (noting that state-level Republican Party organizations
played a role in judicial selection during the Eisenhower presidency when both home-state
Senators were Democrats). This system of “courtesy” also ensured ideological diversity,
since both liberal northern Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats helped
select nominees. Indeed, the role of state officials was so important that ideological
rankings of judges were based on home-state Senators and not the President’s political
party. See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal
Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RSCH. Q. 623, 631, 638
(2001) [hereinafter Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges] (“[T]hese findings suggest that, at a
minimum, Presidents under the condition of senatorial courtesy become more responsive
to the political milieu of the state . . . .”).
87 See Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and Federal Judicial Appointments,
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 525, 526 fig.2 (2018) (showing that only about five to
twenty percent of federal circuit court nominees were not confirmed during the era from
the Truman through the Carter administrations).
88 See David Von Drehle, Political Split Is Pervasive, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/25/political-split-is-pervasive/
aa71188d-303b-4a0f-a199-c533104a9b4e (“[Reagan] coaxed religious conservatives and
Cold Warriors away from the Democratic Party while making it uncomfortable for liberals
to remain in the GOP.”); see also Kate O’Beirne, Rockefeller Republicans Take
Manhattan, NAT’L REV. (July 7, 2004, 12:39 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2004/07/
rockefeller-republicans-take-manhattan-kate-obeirne (reporting that the Republican
National Convention during President George W. Bush’s second presidential campaign
appealed to swing voters by enlisting speakers considered to be the “mavericks and
dissidents who represent[ed] a minority in Ronald Reagan’s GOP”).
89 DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 134 (1999).
90 David M. O’Brien, Federal Judgeships in Retrospect (quoting Stephen Markman, one
of the Reagan administration officials in charge of judicial selection), in THE REAGAN
PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC CONSERVATISM AND ITS LEGACIES 327, 331 (W. Elliot Brownlee
& Hugh Davis Graham eds., 2003), as reprinted in Why Many Think That Ronald Reagan’s
Court Appointments May Have Been His Chief Legacy, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, http://
www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/10968 (last visited June 6, 2021).

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 13 Side B

11/18/2021 14:12:20

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-5\NYU501.txt

1394

unknown

Seq: 22

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

18-NOV-21

14:02

[Vol. 96:1373

Reagan administration saw the courts as a “primary player in the formulation of public policy.”91
The Reagan administration also laid the seeds for the growth of
the conservative legal network. Through Attorney General Edwin
Meese’s embrace of the nascent Federalist Society, which was established in 1982,92 the administration sought to groom well-credentialed,
committed conservatives who would eventually become federal courts
of appeals judges and Supreme Court Justices.93 As Federalist Society
cofounder and Meese’s special assistant Steve Calabresi put it:
“[T]here was a real desire to train a generation of people—a farm
team—who might go on later on in future Republican administrations
to have an impact and to hold more important positions.”94
The Reagan Revolution transformed federal judicial politics, particularly in the lower federal courts.95 President Reagan was arguably
more committed to ideology than any President before him and he
saw federal appellate judges as key players in the emerging
Republican-Democrat schism.96 An analysis of decisions between
1981 and 2004 by Reagan-appointed courts of appeals judges revealed
that Reagan appointees were more conservative than appointees of
91

Id. (quoting Reagan Department of Justice official Bruce Fein).
See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 138 (2008) [hereinafter TELES, RISE]. Meese became
Attorney General in 1985. President Reagan’s first-term Attorney General, William
French Smith, was an establishment lawyer who had no plan to advance conservative goals
over the long term. See Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers
and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 66–67 (2009)
[hereinafter Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy] (noting that while Smith was a
conservative, Meese was so centrally connected to the conservative movement that his
political and personal identity was always tied to the Federalist Society in some way).
93 See Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 92, at 69 (“The legacy of the
department’s investment in personnel can be found on the bench . . . .”); see also TELES,
RISE, supra note 92, at 141–42 (describing the Reagan Justice Department’s hiring of
Federalist Society members, signaling that “clear ideological positioning . . . was now an
affirmative qualification for appointed office”).
94 Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 92, at 73. At the same time, the
Reagan administration was somewhat limited in its ability to nominate reliable
conservatives to the bench. The Federalist Society was just getting off the ground, so “it
was hard to find” competent, credentialed, conservative lawyers. Id. at 70–71 (quoting
Reagan Department of Justice official Richard Willard).
95 See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 77, at 339–42 (documenting the
impact Meese and the Federalist Society had on the judiciary, such that half of President
George W. Bush’s appointments to the federal courts of appeals were Federalist Society
members).
96 See David M. O’Brien, If the Bench Becomes a Brawl: Reagan’s Legacy for U.S.
Courts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-08-23op-2934-story.html (“While all Presidents reward those in their own party, Reagan has
surpassed others . . . . Judges are regarded by the Reagan Administration as both symbols
and instruments of presidential power . . . .”).
92
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earlier Republican administrations,97 and that Reagan appointees
became more conservative over time.98 By appointing eighty-three
federal courts of appeals judges from 1981 to 1988 (roughly fifty-five
percent of all sitting federal appellate judges by the end of his term),99
President Reagan made a huge impact on the federal judiciary. In particular, judicial appointments began to be seen as partisan and ideological, a tool that would reinforce the growing divide separating
Republicans from Democrats.100
C.

Judicial Appointments in the Age of Party Polarization

In the years since the Reagan administration, the ideological and
partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans has grown and
grown. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ideological gap between
Democrats and Republicans began to emerge but was still modest.101
Republicans, for example, were as supportive of abortion rights as
Democrats,102 and several Republican Senators backed abortion
rights by voting against Robert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination.103
By 1994, twenty-three percent of Republicans were more liberal than
97

See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 119–21.
Id. at 121–22 (noting that Reagan appointees cast more conservative votes between
1993 to 1996 than they did from 1985 to 1988).
99 FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 9 (select all “U.S. Courts of Appeals” under the “Court”
tab and “Ronald Reagan” under the “Appointing President” tab); U.S. CTS., supra note 75
(showing that an additional fifty-nine appellate judgeships were created during Reagan’s
presidency, totaling 152 federal appellate judgeships by 1989).
100 See, e.g., DEVINS & BAUM, COMPANY, supra note 78, at 121–22 (“The growing
emphasis on policy considerations in the selection of Justices parallels the growth in
partisan polarization, and it is largely an effect of that polarization.”).
101 See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 77, at 323 (“The rapid rise in
partisan sorting began in the 1980s; starting in the 1990s, a surge of southern Republicans
substantially propelled the polarization of the parties.”).
102 See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2067–68 (2011) (stating that sixty-eight
percent of Republicans and fifty-eight percent of Democrats supported abortion rights);
see also Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party
Polarization, and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government,
69 VAND. L. REV. 935, 953 (2016) (noting that between Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
“abortion did not sharply divide Democrats and Republicans”).
103 Linda Greenhouse, Bork’s Nomination Is Rejected, 58-42; Reagan Saddened, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/24/politics/borks-nomination-isrejected-5842-reagan-saddened.html (noting that six out of forty-six Republican Senators
voted against Bork); see also Binder & Maltzman, supra note 86, at 321 (describing Bork’s
defeat as a “watershed” in making judicial confirmation politics both partisan and
ideological (quoting John Anthony Maltese, Anatomy of a Confirmation Mess: Recent
Trends in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, JURIST (Apr. 15, 2004), https://
web.archive.org/web/20040430024910/http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/
maltese-printer.php)).
98
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the median Democrat, and seventeen percent of Democrats were
more conservative than the median Republican.104 That dynamic is a
thing of the past. In 2017, those numbers had shrunk to one and three
percent, respectively.105 Similarly, Republican-Democrat differences
on political issues more than doubled from 1994 to 2017.106
This partisan sorting also spurred two related developments, each
of which fundamentally transformed social and professional interactions between Democrats and Republicans. First, Republicans and
Democrats increasingly feel a sense of rivalry towards each other and
“dislike, even loathe, their opponents.”107 By 2017, research showed
that “Americans are less likely to have the kind of interpersonal contact across party lines that can dampen harsh beliefs about each
other.”108 Second, “[e]lite status [no longer] trump[s] ideology and
partisanship.”109 Affluent Democrats now “express liberal attitudes
on virtually every issue” and affluent Republicans have an “outsized
influence on the GOP coalition.”110
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104 See Jocelyn Kiley, In Polarized Era, Fewer Americans Hold a Mix of Conservative
and Liberal Views, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/10/23/in-polarized-era-fewer-americans-hold-a-mix-of-conservative-and-liberalviews.
105 PEW RSCH. CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN
WIDER 13 (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/
10-05-2017-Political-landscape-release-updt..pdf.
106 Id. at 3.
107 Cf. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social
Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OP. Q. 405, 405–07 (2012) (arguing that the
“mere act of identifying with a political party is sufficient to trigger negative evaluations of
the opposition”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, ‘Partyism’ Now Trumps Racism,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2014, 8:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201409-22/partyism-now-trumps-racism (noting that Democrats and Republicans increasingly
disapprove of a family member marrying outside of their political party). 2012 data
revealed a huge spike in the unfavorability rating of the opposition party. In 1980, surveyed
voters gave the opposition party an average favorability rating of 45 out of 100; in 1992,
that rating dropped slightly to 40; in 2012, the rating dropped precipitously to 30. Ezra
Klein & Alvin Chang, “Political Identity Is Fair Game for Hatred”: How Republicans and
Democrats Discriminate, VOX (Dec. 7, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/12/7/
9790764/partisan-discrimination.
108 Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political Enemies, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitterpolitical-enemies.html.
109 See Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization,
and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L.J. 661, 688, 694–95 (2013)
(observing that prior to this period, affluent Democrats and Republicans agreed with each
other on political issues more often than they agreed with less affluent people within their
own parties).
110 PEW RSCH. CTR., POLITICAL TYPOLOGY REVEALS DEEP FISSURES ON THE RIGHT
AND LEFT 2, 4 (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/
2018/09/10-24-2017-Typology-release.pdf.
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This ideological and social sorting of elite Democrats and
Republicans is profoundly important to judicial selection and
decision-making. The pool of Democrats who might be nominated for
a federal judgeship is now uniformly liberal, just as the Republican
pool is uniformly conservative. Correspondingly, the liberalism or
conservatism of judges and prospective judges is continually reinforced by the social networks they inhabit.111 Republican judges and
judicial candidates demonstrate their conservative bona fides and
cement important personal relationships by participating in Federalist
Society events, and Democrats frequently look to analogue liberal
groups.112 In this way, the polarization of elite social networks
cements the ideological predispositions of judges and potential judges.
The rise of the Federalist Society as the de facto screener of
Republican judges is particularly instructive in this regard. Just eight
out of forty-two federal courts of appeals judges nominated by
President George H.W. Bush were Federalist Society members.113 By
the end of President George W. Bush’s first term, approximately half
of his judicial appointments were Federalist Society members.114 And
by 2016, the imprint of the Federalist Society on judicial appointments
was dramatic. Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump declared
that his judicial nominees would be “picked by [the] Federalist

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 15 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

111 See Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 92 (describing pervasive liberal
and conservative social networks). Like everyone else, a judge’s self-esteem is linked to the
esteem in which she is held by others, especially those in her social and professional
networks. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 117 (2006).
112 See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:12
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/how-the-federalist-society-became-thede-facto-selector-of-republican-supreme-court-justices.html (pointing out, however, that
no progressive group has come close to the Federalist Society’s dominance over the judicial
nomination process).
113 See, e.g., Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the
Federal Judiciary, 62 POL. RSCH. Q. 366, 367, 367 tbl.1 (2009); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 9
(select all “U.S. Courts of Appeals” under the “Court” tab and “George H.W. Bush”
under the “Appointing President” tab). President Bush’s court of appeals nominees who
were Federalist Society members included Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and John
Roberts. Scherer & Miller, supra, at 367 tbl.1.
114 See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 77, at 342. President George W.
Bush’s appointees to the federal courts of appeals included John Roberts, Neil Gorsuch,
and Brett Kavanaugh. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 9 (select all “U.S. Courts of Appeals”
under the “Court” tab and “George W. Bush” under the “Appointing President” tab). The
Federalist Society was also instrumental in President George W. Bush’s Supreme Court
appointments. See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 77, at 342–43 (detailing the
Federalist Society’s role in forcing the replacement of Harriet Miers, who did not have
close ties to the Society, with Federalist Society darling Samuel Alito as the nominee to
replace Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2005).
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115 Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remakingcourts-judiciary.html.
116 See Adam Liptak, ‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly, but . . . , N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html
(suggesting that journalists should sometimes reveal the political affiliation of federal
judges, given the apparent role political preferences play in some decisions).
117 See THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 4, 163 (2014).
118 Id. at 149 tbl.3.5.
119 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 122–23.
120 See id. at 120–21, 120 tbl.6-3. The Sunstein study looked at the percentage of liberal
votes over time and compared President Clinton’s appointees to those of Democratic
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter. Id. at 120 tbl.6-3.
121 See id. (comparing percentage of liberal votes by judges nominated by Presidents
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford to the percentage of liberal votes by judges nominated by
Presidents Reagan and the two Bushes).
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Society.”115 By this time, the consequences of party polarization had
metastasized. Conservative-liberal divisions gave way to RepublicanDemocratic differences.116 Party and ideology were now inextricably
linked, and the ideological divide on the federal courts of appeals and
Supreme Court was now a partisan split.
Within the federal courts of appeals, Thomas Keck measured
Republican-Democratic differences from 1993 to 2013 on issues that
divided the parties, such as abortion, affirmative action, gun rights,
and same-sex marriage.117 Keck did this by looking at votes cast by
courts of appeals judges and found the average difference to be thirtythree percentage points.118 Cass Sunstein’s examination of federal
courts of appeal decisions between 1981 and 2004 likewise found a
“significant difference between Republican and Democratic
appointees, and as the relative proportion changes, the ideological orientation of the federal courts will change as well.”119
Sunstein’s study of the federal courts of appeals is particularly
relevant to our hypothesis. It speaks to a growing ideological gap
between Republican and Democratic appointees, based on a comparison of liberal votes cast over time, and attributes this divide principally to the increasing conservativism of Republican appointees. In
particular, the percentage of liberal votes cast by appointees of
President Bill Clinton from 1993 to 2004 was nearly identical to the
percentage of liberal votes cast by other Democratic appointees.120 In
contrast, there was a much sharper divide between Republican judges
appointed before 1981 and judges appointed by Presidents Reagan
and the two Bushes.121 These data highlight the rise of the conservative legal movement and, with it, the growing impact of the Federalist
Society. A 2009 study of judicial decision-making by federal courts of
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appeals judges found that judges with Federalist Society ties were significantly more conservative than other judges.122
D.

“Trump Judges” and “Obama Judges”

When President Donald Trump complained about an “Obama
judge” ruling against him in 2018, he was thus stating the obvious,
albeit in a controversial way123: party polarization by that point had
become pervasive and increasingly salient. Today, the ever-growing
divide between Democrats and Republicans has led to an increasing
emphasis on ideology in judicial appointments (especially by
Republicans) and to winner-take-all politics in the U.S. Senate (by
both parties). Judicial appointment partisan politics has now reached a
fever pitch.
During the Obama Administration, from 2009 to 2017, President
Obama aimed to reshape the federal courts of appeals by striving for
more diversity on the bench. Forty-two percent of President Obama’s
appointees to the federal courts were women, compared to twentyone percent for President George W. Bush and twenty-five percent
for President Donald Trump; twenty percent were Black, compared to
eight percent for President Bush and five percent for President
Trump.124 President Obama appointed a total of fifty-five judges to
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122 See Scherer & Miller, supra note 113, at 376. This finding tracks the growing
ideological divide on the U.S. Supreme Court, where today’s Democratic appointees are
no more liberal than earlier Democratic appointees but today’s Republican appointees are
far more conservative than earlier Republican appointees. See Lee Epstein, William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Revisiting the Ideology Rankings of Supreme Court Justices,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 307 tbl.2 (2015) (showing that Justices appointed in the later
twentieth century, like Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Roberts, voted more conservatively
than their most conservative predecessors, while more recent liberal appointees voted
equally as liberally, if not more conservatively, as their ideological predecessors).
123 See Maria Sacchetti & Sarah Kinosian, Trump Lashes Out at Judge After Order to
Allow Illegal Border Crossers to Seek Asylum, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:08 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/judges-ruling-means-trumpadministration-must-allow-illegal-border-crossers-to-seek-asylum/2018/11/20/1aebd608ecc1-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.
124 See Elliot Slotnick, Sara Schiavoni & Sheldon Goldman, Obama’s Judicial Legacy:
The Final Chapter, 5 J.L. & CTS. 363, 403 tbl.8 (2017); Trump’s Confirmed Judges, ALL.
FOR JUST. (May 3, 2020), https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Confirmed5.3.20.pdf; see also MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE
ROBERTS COURT 74 (2013) (noting that Democratic presidents have placed a stronger
emphasis on race and gender diversity). By focusing on these alternative criteria, President
Obama disappointed progressives who wanted strong liberals; instead, President Obama’s
nominees—while liberal—sometimes did not reflect the most progressive values of the
Democratic elite. See Charlie Savage, Obama Lags on Judicial Picks, Limiting His Mark
on Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/us/politics/
obama-lags-on-filling-seats-in-the-judiciary.html (noting that President Obama had
“largely shied away from nominating assertive liberals” and that his “emphasis on diversity
. . . slowed the search” for judicial nominees).
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the U.S. courts of appeals—around one-third of all federal courts of
appeals judges by the end of his term.125 Ideological measures of judicial appointments from Presidents Nixon to Trump rank President
Obama’s judges as more liberal than any other cohort from that time
period.126
The Obama era also raised the temperature of confirmation battles by introducing a fundamental shift in Senate confirmation politics.
In response to Senate Republicans’ efforts to delay and defeat
President Obama’s judicial appointments,127 Senate Democrats
invoked the so-called nuclear option in 2013, allowing the thenmajority Democratic Senate to confirm federal district and courts of
appeals judges by an up-or-down majority vote.128 With Republicans
in control of the Senate for the final two years of the Obama administration, President Obama was able to fill only two appellate judgeships.129 More striking, Senate Republicans blocked any consideration
of President Obama’s 2016 Supreme Court nominee Merrick
Garland.130 Indeed, the link between party and ideology is now so
strong that Mitch McConnell defined his legacy as Senate Majority
Leader by his ability to block President Obama’s nominations while
pushing through President Trump’s nominations.131 In so doing,
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125 See Lawrence Hurley, Obama’s Judges Leave Liberal Imprint on U.S. Law,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2016, 10:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-obama/
obamas-judges-leave-liberal-imprint-on-u-s-law-idUSKCN1110BC.
126 See Jon Green, The Ideology of Trump’s Judges, DEMAND JUST. (Jan. 2019), https://
demandjustice.org/reports/ideology-of-trump-judges (demonstrating that the average
ideological score of President Obama’s cohort of judges was more to the left than those of
the judges appointed by Presidents Clinton and Carter). This study used the donor-based
scoring method developed by Adam Bonica and Maya Sen. See Adam Bonica & Maya
Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and Legal Profession, 25 POL.
ANALYSIS 114 (2017); see also Li Zhou, Study: Trump’s Judicial Appointees Are More
Conservative than Those of Past Republican Presidents, VOX (Jan. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/1/25/18188541/trump-judges-mconnell-senate (discussing the
Green study and explaining the Bonica and Sen scoring system).
127 See Slotnick et al., supra note 124, at 370–71 (discussing then-Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell’s obstruction of President Obama’s judicial nominees). Senate
Democrats similarly sought to defeat President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees. See
Binder & Maltzman, supra note 86, at 323–25.
128 See Humberto Sanchez, A Landmark Change to Filibuster, CQ WKLY., Dec. 2, 2013,
at 1992, 1992.
129 See Ian Millhiser, What Trump Has Done to the Courts, Explained, VOX (Sept. 29,
2020, 10:32 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/9/20962980/trumpsupreme-court-federal-judges. One of those two was appointed to the Federal Circuit. See
id. (noting that Judge Kara Farnandez Stoll was confirmed to a “highly specialized court
that primarily deals with patent law”).
130 See Slotnick et al., supra note 124, at 364 (“However, Garland was not even
accorded the courtesy of a Senate hearing much less a vote on the Senate floor.”).
131 McConnell put it this way: “What I want to do is make a lasting contribution to the
country. . . . I believe working in conjunction with the administration, we’re making a
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Senate Republicans explicitly linked ideology to political party,
claiming that the 2016 presidential election should settle whether a
liberal or conservative was to be appointed to the Supreme Court.132
Following his election in 2016, President Donald Trump then put
his foot on the accelerator to divide judicial appointments in partisan
ways. His imprint on the federal courts of appeals was “swift and historic.”133 President Trump’s judges were ranked most conservative by
the ideological measure that ranked President Obama’s judges as
most liberal.134 Under this measure, the ideological gap between
President Trump’s and President Obama’s judges is greater than it has
ever been.135
President Trump’s impact was bolstered by his ability to name an
extraordinary number of federal courts of appeals judges.136 Fifty-four
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generational change in our country . . . .” The Hugh Hewitt Show, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell on the Federal Judiciary and the Pace of Appoinments [sic], HUGH
HEWITT (May 3, 2018), https://www.hughhewitt.com/senate-majority-leader-mitchmcconnell-on-the-federal-judiciary-and-the-pace-of-appoinments; see also CARL HULSE,
CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE SUPREME COURT, FROM
SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH 278–79 (2019) (describing McConnell telling an
audience that the most important decision in his political career was to block Merrick
Garland’s nomination and push through Neil Gorsuch’s appointment).
132 See Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, Opinion, McConnell and Grassley:
Democrats Shouldn’t Rob Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldntrob-voters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be552cc3c1e4b76b_story.html (arguing that American voters rejected President Obama and his
preferences after the 2014 midterm elections shifted control of the Senate to the
Republicans).
133 Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative
Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.html.
134 See Green, supra note 126; see also Rebecca R. Ruiz & Robert Gebeloff, As Trump
Leaves the White House, His Imprint on the Judiciary Deepens, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/us/politics/trump-judges-appeals-courts.html (noting
that President Trump’s federal appellate appointees were more consistently conservative,
in that they were more likely than past Republican appointees to clash with Democratic
appointees).
135 Green, supra note 126. For additional discussion, see infra notes 146–47 and
accompanying text (highlighting the increasing role of party affiliation in whether a judge
is more likely to agree or disagree with same and opposite party judges).
136 Russell Wheeler, Judicial Appointments in Trump’s First Three Years: Myths and
Realities, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/
28/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities (“Trump has
appointed more court of appeals judges . . . than any predecessor.”). Senate Republicans
did all they could do to help President Trump transform the federal judiciary. They
eliminated the minority party’s power to derail both Supreme Court nominees (by
filibustering) and federal courts of appeals nominations (by having home-state Senators
block judicial nominations through blue slips). See Astead W. Herndon, Filibuster Broken,
Gorsuch Vote Is Set, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 6, 2017, 7:36 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
news/nation/2017/04/06/republicans-nuclear-advance-gorsuch-some-warn-dire-
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courts of appeals nominees by President Trump were confirmed—
thirty percent of all courts of appeals judges.137 Four circuits flipped
from majority Democratic appointees to majority Republican
appointees (the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh), four circuits
have become more solidly composed of Republican appointees (the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth), and three circuits have remained
majority Democrat-appointees—but less so, as there are now more
Republican appointees than before (the Fourth, Tenth, and the
District of Columbia).138
President Trump’s judicial appointments also reflect the ascendancy of the conservative legal movement in general, and of the
Federalist Society in particular. President Trump’s appellate court
picks are the most likely to agree with their Republican colleagues
(approximately ninety-seven percent) and the most likely to disagree
with their Democratic colleagues (approximately eleven percent).139
All but eight of President Trump’s first fifty-one appellate nominees
were members of the Federalist Society.140 When the U.S. Judicial
Conference questioned the appropriateness of federal judges being
members of the Federalist Society,141 210 federal judges (ninety-three
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consequences/cS2ARRztIC3eaTEH1Y2fEP/story.html; Niels Lesniewski, McConnell:
Democratic ‘Blue Slips’ Won’t Block Trump Judges, ROLL CALL (Oct. 11, 2017, 11:28 AM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2017/10/11/mcconnell-democratic-blue-slips-wont-block-trumpjudges.
137 See Carl Hulse, With Wilson Confirmation, Trump and Senate Republicans Achieve a
Milestone, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/trumpsenate-judges-wilson.html (noting that President Trump had filled all courts of appeals
vacancies as of June 2020, thereby limiting the power of a succeeding administration to
reshape the judiciary).
138 See Flipping Circuit Courts, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/flipping-circuit-courts [hereinafter Flipping
Circuit Courts]. The Ninth Circuit flipped in February 2020. See Dolan, supra note 61.
President Trump did not make any nominations to the First Circuit. FED. JUD. CTR., supra
note 9 (select “First Circuit” under the “Court” tab and “Donald J. Trump” under the
“Appointing President” tab).
139 Ruiz et al., supra note 133. In other words, Trump judges disagreed with Republican
colleagues approximately three percent of the time as compared to an approximately
eleven percent disagreement rate with Democratic colleagues. This eight-point range was
at least twice as large as the agreement-disagreement range of appointees of any other
president. Id.
140 Id. When White House Counsel Don McGahn was asked about outsourcing judicial
appointments to the Federalist Society, he remarked that the selection seemed to have
been “insourced,” as President Trump’s judicial selection team was also made up of
Federalist Society members. Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/
trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html.
141 The Judicial Conference draft recommendation extended to other ideological
groups, including the American Constitution Society. See Caroline Fredrickson & Eric J.
Segall, Trump Judges or Federalist Society Judges? Try Both, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2020),
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percent of whom were appointed by Republican presidents, including
forty-six of President Trump’s then-fifty-one federal court of appeals
appointees)142 defended the Federalist Society and accused the
Judicial Conference both of favoring left-leaning organizations like
the American Bar Association and of engaging in “rank discrimination based on its erroneous perception of a Federalist Society viewpoint.”143 This circling of the wagons by Trump and Republican
appointees further underscores the ever-growing linkage between partisanship and ideology.
In sum, the partisan divide on today’s courts of appeals is wider
than it has ever been. When President Reagan was elected in 1980,
there was next to no ideological divide between Democratic and
Republican judicial appointees. When President Trump took office in
2017, there was a pronounced divide separating Republican and
Democratic appointees. Today, Presidents place a “near exclusive
focus on ideological compatibility and reliability.”144
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/opinion/trump-judges-federalist-society.html
(discussing the political ties of both organizations).
142 See Jacqueline Thomsen, Congress Scrutinizes Federal Judiciary’s Proposed Block on
Federalist Society Memberships, NAT’L. L.J. (May 18, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/2020/05/18/congress-scrutinizes-federal-judiciarys-proposed-block-onfederalist-society-memberships.
143 See Letter from Gregory G. Katsas, J., U.S. Ct. of Appeals, D.C. Cir., et al., to
Robert P. Deyling, Assistant Gen. Couns., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 5 (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6928-judges-respond-to-draft-ethics/
53eaddfaf39912a26ae7/optimized/full.pdf; see also Rebecca R. Ruiz & Ben Protess, Trump
Nominee Is Among Judges Opposed to Banning Membership in Conservative Group, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/us/politics/judges-federalistsociety.html (describing such opposition by judges, including Judge Walker, who was then a
judge on the U.S. District Court in Kentucky and now sits on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals).
144 Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the U.S.
Supreme Court, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF
POLITICAL POLARIZATION 171, 177 (Thurber & Yoshinaka eds., 2015). It is anticipated that
President Biden’s judicial appointments will be more liberal than President Obama’s and,
relatedly, that President Biden will emphasize ideology when nominating judges. See
Andrew Kragie, Biden’s Judges Will Likely Be More Liberal than Obama’s, LAW 360 (Nov.
30, 2020, 11:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1332634/biden-s-judges-will-likely-bemore-liberal-than-obama-s; Harper Neidig, Biden Team Asks Senate Democrats to
Recommend Public Defenders, Civil Rights Lawyers for Federal Bench, HILL (Dec. 30,
2020, 6:31 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/532164-biden-team-asks-senatedems-to-recommend-public-defenders-civil (discussing the Biden administration’s
commitment to progressive ideology as reflected in efforts to appoint civil rights lawyers
and public defenders to the federal bench, in lieu of prosecutors and corporate attorneys);
Jacqueline Thomsen, Public Defender Experience and Diversity Dominates at Biden’s
Judicial Nominees’ Debut Hearing, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 28, 2021, 2:34 PM), https://
www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/04/28/public-defender-experience-and-diversitydominates-at-bidens-judicial-nominees-debut-hearing (reporting on the same).
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In today’s hyper-polarized world, Democrat-dominated circuits
are expected to advance liberal causes and Republican-dominated circuits are expected to advance conservative causes. For this very
reason, lawsuits challenging Obama administration initiatives were
typically launched in the Republican-dominated Fifth Circuit, while
the majority of lawsuits challenging President Trump’s initiatives were
pursued in the formerly Democrat-controlled Ninth and Second
Circuits.145
More to the point, the balance of Democrats and Republicans on
a circuit is hugely consequential. On issues that divide the parties,
Democratic and Republican courts of appeals judges are increasingly
likely to disagree with each other.146 A randomly assigned panel on a
Democrat-dominated circuit is more likely to have at least two
Democratic judges, and is thus more likely to back Democratic claims,
while Republican claims are more likely to prevail in circuits dominated by Republican appointees.147 Presidents know this, Senators
know this, and litigants know this. This, of course, is why the flipping
of party control of a circuit is a big deal.148 And this is why partisan
battle lines have been drawn regarding the process of selecting and
confirming federal courts of appeals judges.
145

Paul Nolette, Multistate Lawsuits vs. the Federal Government – Totals, STATE LITIG.
AG ACTIVITY DATABASE (Jan. 19, 2021), https://attorneysgeneral.org/multistatelawsuits-vs-the-federal-government/statistics-and-visualizations-multistate-litigation-vsthe-federal-government; see also Fred Barbash, Litigation Against Executive Branch by
Coalitions of States Grows in Response to Unilateral Actions by President and Gridlocked
Congress, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/litigation-against-executive-branch-by-coalitions-of-states-grows-inresponse-to-unilateral-actions-by-president-and-gridlocked-congress/2019/08/24/34267560c5bf-11e9-b72f-b31dfaa77212_story.html (reporting on the correlation between dominant
circuit ideology and success rates of such lawsuits); Dylan Matthews, How the 9th Circuit
Became Conservatives’ Least Favorite Court, VOX (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/10/16873718/ninth-circuit-court-appeals-liberalconservative-trump-tweet (discussing the liberal reputation of the Ninth and Second
Circuits); Madison Alder, Trump Flips New York-Based 2nd Circuit as Menashi
Confirmed, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 14, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/trump-flips-new-york-based-second-circuit-as-menashi-confirmed (reporting on
the Second Circuit’s 2019 flip from a majority of Democratic appointees to a majority of
Republican appointees); Dolan, supra note 61 (reporting on the same partisan flip in the
Ninth Circuit in 2020).
146 Cf. supra note 139 and accompanying text.
147 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 45. Correspondingly, when a panel has three
judges of the same party, the judges are more likely to “amplify” their partisan ideological
positions. Id. For additional discussion of so-called “panel effects,” see infra notes 185–96
and accompanying text.
148 See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (2009)
(hypothesizing that federal circuit judges tend to focus less on the potential of Supreme
Court reversal and more on the preferences of the majority of the judges on their circuit).
AND
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By now, our original en banc hypothesis should seem quite
obvious. Party control of a circuit means that the majority party can
advance its agenda through en banc review. Specifically, when the
minority party has two or more members on the panel, the majority
party can use en banc review to vacate the panel decision and put in
place a decision that comports with the majority party’s view. This
type of majority-party discipline seems likely to track the rise of ideological polarization on the courts of appeals. Today’s Democrat and
Republican judges are more likely to disagree with each other, and
Democratic and Republican judges increasingly see themselves as
members of competing ideological and social networks. Partisan divisions therefore seem more likely to occur, and en banc review is more
likely to be seen as a weapon to advance majority party preferences.
That, at least, is what we expected to find in our review of en
banc decisions, perfectly consistent with the larger story of polarization and the salience of ideology to judicial decision-making. What we
did find, as described below, is far more interesting. Sometimes being
wrong has its benefits.

EN BANC

III
REALITY: DESCRIPTION

OF

DATA

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 19 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

The unique descriptive contribution in this paper is longitudinal:
We offer the first study of en banc decisions over the entire United
States for an extended period of time. We gathered en banc decisions
from the First through Eleventh Circuits and the D.C. Circuit,
although not the Federal Circuit, for the following years: 1966 to 1968,
1976 to 1978, 1986 to 1988, 1996 to 1998, 2006 to 2008, and 2016 to
2018. We then additionally coded en banc decisions from those twelve
circuits from 2019 and 2020. This amounted to 952 total en banc decisions—significantly larger than any other en banc database.
Collecting the en banc cases was more challenging than we first
anticipated, because many en banc cases are not labeled as such, or
are not labeled in a place that is easy to find. It turns out we were
unable to locate any comprehensive single method of collecting the
cases (which likely explains why the database we wanted did not
exist), so we used three different techniques to obtain as many en
banc decisions as possible: (1) a text search of case synopses on
Westlaw verified by manually checking the number of judges participating; (2) a search of the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated
Database; and (3) a search for citations to en banc opinions in subsequent cases. We pursued the following process to collect en banc
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149 This methodology was refined and improved tirelessly by Paul Hellyer, a truly
amazing reference librarian from the William & Mary Law Library.
150 Federal Court Cases: FJC Integrated Database (IDB) 1970 to Present, FED. JUD.
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb (last visited June 30, 2021).
151 We used the search query banc /5 cir., modifying it to search for particular years or
circuits as needed. For example, we used banc /5 “1st cir.” /5 (1966 1967 1968) to find
citations to First Circuit en banc cases that were decided between 1966 and 1968.
Considering how elusive en banc opinions can be, we acknowledge that our dataset
probably omits a small number of en banc opinions from the time periods we studied, but
we are confident that any such slight omission would not change our conclusions.
152 We applied the ninety percent rule to every circuit regardless of the number of
judges, but we required there to be at least two judges in each party, to account for circuits
with a small number of judges sitting at any given time. Our definition means, however,
that in decisions with less than ten judges, to qualify as a partisan split, we required voting
down perfectly partisan lines. For decisions that involved more than ten judges, there could
be one defector and still qualify as a partisan split. One reason for using the ninety percent
rule instead of only counting partisan splits is to account for judges, like Judge Gregory of
the Fourth Circuit, who were technically nominated and confirmed by a President of one
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cases.149 First, we used Westlaw’s caselaw database for the U.S. Courts
of Appeals and found that the search query PR,SY(banc) offered the
best balance of accuracy and recall. It searches the case name and
preliminary and synopsis fields, where the word banc will appear if an
en banc opinion has been clearly labeled as such, and it avoids the
spelling variation between “in banc” and “en banc.” Second, we
extracted from the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated Database
(IDB) a list of cases they coded as en banc.150 Finally, we searched
Westlaw’s federal case law database for citations to en banc opinions.151 We manually verified results from all of our techniques to
weed out false positives.
Our goal was to get “the long view”—to track patterns of en banc
decisions over time. We coded, inter alia, the following attributes of
each case: the year of the en banc decision; the name and appointing
President of each panel judge, with any dissenters listed separately;
the name and appointing President of each participating en banc
judge, with any dissenters listed separately; a summary of the issue
and holding; and the effect on the panel if any (i.e., reversed or
affirmed). We also coded for whether the ultimate decision included
the resolution of a federal constitutional claim (our proxy for high
salience), whether the en banc review was requested by a party or by a
judge, and whether the Supreme Court ultimately took the case.
As described above, we relied on two main measures to capture
the use of en banc as a weapon: partisan splits and partisan reversals.
Partisan splits are divided en banc decisions where at least ninety percent of the judges vote in line with other judges appointed by
Presidents of the same political party and against those nominated by
the other party.152 Partisan reversals are en banc decisions that seem
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A.

Partisan Splits and Partisan Reversals over Time

First, some basics. As you can see in the two figures below, the
number of en banc decisions rose in the 1980s and leveled off in the

11/18/2021 14:12:20

party, but were originally nominated (but not confirmed) by a President of the opposite
party. See Gregory, Roger L., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/gregoryroger-l (last visited June 13, 2021) (explaining that Judge Gregory was nominated to a
recess appointment by President Clinton, and then re-nominated to the same position by
President Bush and confirmed by the Senate).
153 “Party” refers to the party of the nominating President. “Majority party” means the
party, if any, with the most en banc judges appointed by a President of that party.
154 It is worth noting that we found this impossible to do—judges do not always explain
why they do go en banc, and they practically never explain when they do not. For an
examination of published dissents to denials en banc, see Jeremy D. Horowitz, Not Taking
No for an Answer: An Empirical Assessment of Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En
Banc, 102 GEO. L. J. 59 (2013). For further discussion, see supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
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to target renegade panel opinions for potentially partisan reasons. We
identified a partisan reversal if four conditions were met: (1) the panel
opinion is reversed, (2) most judges in the panel majority opinion are
from the minority party (the party that is not dominant in the circuit
at the time), (3) most majority party judges vote to reverse the panel
en banc, and (4) most minority party judges dissent en banc.153
Although comprehensive in scope, our data is still subject to several important limitations. First, and most importantly, we only collected and studied decisions that actually went en banc; we do not
have any observations to offer about decisions not to go en banc.154
Second, we did not code for “reasons to go en banc,” largely because
judges do not always speak to this in the opinion, (or often they do not
agree on what the reason was) and, after several false starts, we found
it difficult to consistently label the rationale. Third, we make no causation claims. We can count how many times a circuit goes en banc and
reverses a renegade minority panel and we can count how often the
judges vote in lock-step with other judges appointed by Presidents of
the same party. But, of course, we cannot say for sure why the judge
voted one way or the other, and we leave any regression analysis to
others.
What we did find, however, by taking this long view of en bancs is
rather striking on two levels. First, as noted, our hypothesis was
thwarted—we did not find evidence that partisan reversals and partisan splits tracked the pre-documented history of polarization in judicial appointments. Second, we may be at a turning point—the most
recent data, since 2018, indicates more partisan splits or partisan
reversals in en banc decisions than ever before.
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more modern era. When accounting for caseload variation, however,
the level of en banc decision-making stayed relatively stable over time
and maintained the previously observed rate of around one percent of
all published decisions.155 Figure 1 below shows the number of en
banc decisions we collected and how frequently they were decided
over time, and Figure 2 shows that number divided by the number of
published opinions decided during the same time period.156 No surprise there: We already knew en banc decisions are rare.157
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155 Indeed, while the number of en banc cases rose in the 1980s, the overall percentage
of en banc cases declined. The simple explanation for this phenomenon is that, in
conjunction with the dramatic expansion of the number of federal courts of appeals
judgeships from 1978 to 1984, there was a notable increase in the number of federal courts
of appeals decisions, such that the number of en banc cases could rise while the overall
percentage of en banc cases could decline. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
156 There was, of course, significant circuit variation in terms of en banc activity. Some
circuits have a far more active en banc practice than others do, and even the heavy-users of
en banc fluctuate in their use of the tool over time. We plan to discuss that variation in a
subsequent paper.
157 En banc review would seem even rarer if we considered unpublished as well as
published opinions in calculating the percentage of cases that go en banc. Over the past
fifty years, there has been an exponential growth in the relative percentage of unpublished
opinions by the federal courts of appeals. See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright
Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118
MICH. L. REV. 533, 549 (2020) (noting that the percentage of unpublished federal appellate
merits decisions rose from 59.4 to 88.7 between 1985 and 2016).
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Since our goal was to explore potential partisan behavior, we
needed to focus on the subset of en banc decisions that fell into our
definitions of partisan splits (when judges appointed by one party or
another vote in lock-step with each other) and partisan reversals
(when a renegade panel gets reversed by a circuit dominated by
judges appointed by opposite party Presidents). Given what we
explained in Part II, we fully expected to see very few partisan divisions in the 1960s and 1970s followed by a growing line starting in
1986 that tracked partisan splits and partisan reversals increasing over
time through the present day. What we found, instead, was this:

11/18/2021 14:12:20
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FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF PARTISAN ACTIVITY
EN BANC DECISIONS 1966–2020
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158 We attribute this spike to two interrelated phenomena: the dramatic increase in the
number of federal courts of appeals judgeships and the advent of the Reagan
administration and, with it, the injection of ideology in judicial appointments. See supra
note 75 and accompanying text (detailing growth in courts of appeals judgeships); supra
Section II.B (discussing President Reagan’s judicial appointments).
159 One technical note on the percentage figures: there were a few en banc decisions
where we were missing complete information on, for example, the identity of the panel
judges. We did not include those cases in the denominator when calculating percentages of
cases with partisan activity.
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Notice right away that the steadily increasing line we expected to
see did not materialize. Although there is a spike in the 1986 to 1988
time period, which we expected,158 the rate of partisan splits and partisan reversals dropped in the 1990s and then continued to drop
through the post-2000 years until very recently.159
Significantly, setting aside the 2018 to 2020 data for a moment,
the rate of partisan reversals never crept above fourteen percent. It is
also noteworthy that, looking across all time periods up to 2018, there
is no clear indication that minority panels were especially targeted for
review or that either party is more apt to engage in partisan behavior
than the other. Republican majority courts (circuits with more
Republican appointees than Democratic ones at any given time) actually reviewed more Republican panels en banc (143) than Democratic
panels (133) prior to 2018. Likewise, circuits with Democratic en banc
majorities during this same time reviewed sixty-nine Republican
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panels and seventy-seven Democratic panels. Majority panels, of
course, outnumber minority panels, so it may be that a higher percentage of minority panels are subject to en banc review overall. But it
seems as if the difference does not vary depending on which party is in
control.
Surprised by this finding—but undeterred—we decided to sort
for constitutional cases, on the assumption that the increase in partisan behavior we were looking for might occur more often in the
cases that often make headlines.160 We found that to be true, but we
still did not find the pattern we anticipated.
FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGE OF PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND NON-CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
30%
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160 To be clear, we did not code for political salience. We instead coded for cases that
decided a federal constitutional issue.
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FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND ALL
CASES WITH PARTISAN SPLITS OR PARTISAN REVERSALS
1966–2020
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161 Statistical tests were run in R version 4.0.2. Under this test, the alpha value is 0.05
and the p value (for a result to be found statistically significant) is less than or equal to
0.05. For Table 4, the p value is 0.007 for the one-sided test and 0.013 for the two-sided test.
Nick Bednar, a Ph.D. student in the Vanderbilt Department of Political Science, completed
this analysis. Memorandum from Nick Bednar to Neal Devins and Allison Orr Larsen,
Statistical Analysis of Weaponizing En Banc (May 10, 2021) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Bednar Memorandum].
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As reflected in Figure 4, we did find a statistically significant
increase of partisan splits and partisan reversals in constitutional
cases.161 Nineteen percent of all constitutional cases ended in a partisan split, compared to eleven percent of non-constitutional cases.
Similarly, seventeen percent of all constitutional cases fit our definition of a partisan reversal, compared to ten percent of nonconstitutional cases.
Significantly, however, partisan behavior for constitutional cases
reflects the same stability over time as the non-constitutional cases.
Looking across time, as displayed in Figure 5, one can see that there
are next to no partisan splits and partisan reversals in the 1960s and
1970s. Moreover, after the spike in the 1980s, the partisan splits and
partisan reversals for the constitutional cases stayed relatively constant even if, as one would expect, the constitutional cases generally
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showed more partisan behavior than the non-constitutional cases.162
Indeed, starting in the 2000s, constitutional cases do not stand apart as
having many more partisan splits or partisan reversals than their nonconstitutional counterparts. Consistent with Figure 5, there is no statistically significant difference between the growth in partisan splits or
reversals for constitutional cases as compared to the growth in partisan splits or reversals for nonpartisan cases.163
At this point it seems clear that our hypothesis was incorrect: En
banc decisions in the courts of appeals were not weaponized over time
in a way that would reflect increased partisanship and polarization in
judicial appointments and other documented judicial behavior. In fact,
prior to 2018, neither the rate of partisan splits or partisan reversals
ever climbed over twenty percent of all en banc decisions. And—perhaps most surprising to us—there was no sustained increase of these
partisan decisions over time as we expected. Instead, there seem to be
forces at work that resist the temptation to use en banc as a partisan
weapon, and these forces—which we unpack below—appear relatively constant over time.
B.

A Closer Look at the Trump Era

There is, however, a very important twist to our story. When one
looks at the most recent data, there is a noticeable change. The most
recent time period we studied—2018 to 2020—contained the most evidence of partisan en banc behavior seen over the past six decades.164
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 23 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

162 One clarification for careful readers: the chart above seems to show that in 1976 to
1978, constitutional cases were actually less likely to be partisan. In fact, however, that is
just a sample size problem. We have only two constitutional partisan cases from 1976 to
1978. We thus hesitate to put too much meaning on that drop. At the same time, we are not
surprised that there are only two partisan constitutional cases during this period. As we
discussed in Part II, there was no Democrat-Republican divide in judicial appointments
before the Reagan era; that there are only two relevant cases underscores that fact.
163 A Wald test was performed to examine whether the difference between the growth
in constitutional and nonconstitutional cases is not statistically significant. See Bednar
Memorandum, supra note 161, at 4–5. The p value for the combined years is 0.36. See id.
164 Donald Trump became President in 2017, but it was not until 2018 that the Trump
era began, at least with respect to en banc decision-making. There were only three cases in
2017 in which a Trump-appointed judge sat en banc. The reason is clear: President Trump’s
first appellate nominee was confirmed in May 2017, and there were only four court of
appeals judges appointed by President Trump and confirmed before October 2017. See
FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 9 (select all “U.S. Courts of Appeals” under the “Court” tab,
“Donald J. Trump” under the “President” tab, and “on or before 2017-10-01” under the
“Senate Confirmation Date” tab).
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165 We made use of two separate measures to find the spike statistically significant: the
Fisher’s Exact Test and the Chi-Squared test. The spike was strongly statistically significant
under either measure. For both tests, we used the alpha (significance) level of 5% (0.05).
The p value for the Fisher Exact Test is 0.02881. The p value for the Chi-Squared test is
0.03606. Thanks to our colleague Eric Kades for running the tests.
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Notice how the percentage of cases that we labeled either a partisan split or a partisan reversal (the top line above) rose steadily from
2016 to 2020. From 2018 to 2020, there was a statistically significant
spike in both partisan splits and partisan reversals—more in both categories than we observed in any other time period over six decades.165
Further, referring back to Figure 3 above, the rates of partisan reversals and partisan splits in 2019 and 2020 are higher than at any other
time period we recorded, including the spike in the 1980s we expected
to see.
Cases from 2018 to 2020 are different for another reason. We tallied the split en banc decisions that had defecting judges, meaning
decisions with odd bedfellows, in which one Democrat-appointed
judge votes with Republican-appointed judges and against all other
Democrat-appointed judges, or vice versa. The rate of defection, perhaps a sign of judicial independence or non-partisanship, is dropping
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at the present moment in time—lower than any other time period
before in our study. This is true of both Republican-appointed judges
and Democrat-appointed judges: in recent years, these judges are less
willing than in the past to part ways with their cohorts en banc and
more willing than in the past to vote along party lines and rein in
panels from the other team.

IN

FIGURE 7. PERCENTAGE OF DEFECTING JUDGES
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Relatedly, the number of partisan splits (where the judges align in
near perfect teams according to the party of their appointing
President) also rose dramatically from 2018 to 2020. As you can see in
Figure 3, twenty-seven percent of all en banc decisions from 2018 to
2020 were decided in nearly perfect blocs divided by appointing party
(“partisan splits”). Compare that to twelve percent in 2016 to 2017,
fourteen percent in 2006 to 2008, fifteen percent in 1996 to 1998, and
even twenty percent during the previous high point, 1986 to 1988. Put
most starkly, the rate of partisan en banc splits nearly doubled from
the Obama, Bush, and Clinton eras to the Trump era, and is far higher
now than in any of the years we studied over six decades. From our
data, therefore, it seems judges are lining up in en banc teams now
more than ever before.
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We thus find ourselves with a bit of a cliffhanger: Are the past
three years an outlier or an omen of what the future holds? We now
attempt to answer this question and also to explore why we did not
see the expected rise over time in partisan en banc decisions for most
of the time period we studied.
IV
IMPLICATIONS OF
POWER

LONG VIEW OF EN BANCS: THE
NON-PARTISAN FORCES

THE
OF

During a period of time (1988–2017) where party polarization
among judicial appointees metastasized, what explains the failure of
federal courts of appeals to weaponize en banc review? In this Part,
we will try to make sense of our findings pre-2018. They are counterintuitive. After all, many political scientists believe that federal court
of appeals judges—like Supreme Court Justices—are driven by their
desire to advance their legal policy preferences.166 Why then was en
banc review somewhat impervious to a growing partisan divide?
Our principal claim is that federal court of appeals judges are
committed to more than just advancing their legal policy preferences;
they also care deeply about their reputations regarding judicial independence, collegiality, and other rule-of-law norms. En banc gives us a
unique window into these concerns and how they operate on judicial
decision-making. This does not, of course, mean that judges never use
en banc review for partisan purposes. On occasion they do, as our

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 24 Side B
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166 For “attitudinalists,” policy preferences are all that matter. See generally JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002). With respect to en banc review, attitudinalists argue that “the decision
to grant en banc review reflects the desire of a majority of the judges on a circuit to move a
panel outcome closer to its preferred policy position.” Giles et al., Etiology, supra note 58,
at 451. For “strategic” judges, the advancement of policy preferences might require
compromise; for example, if the three judges on a panel do not agree, those in the majority
might compromise to avoid a potential en banc reversal. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi,
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341, 350 (2010);
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2158–59
(1998) (arguing that “whistleblower” dissents, which expose a court’s apparent disregard of
established doctrine, prevent judges and panels from straying too much from established
law); Deborah Beim, Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Signaling and CounterSignaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Analysis of En Banc Review, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI.
490, 491–92 (2016) (discussing appellate judges’ strategy of writing dissents to panel
opinions to signal to the full circuit that the panel majority’s decision is worthy of review).
In addition to placating a potential dissenter, panel judges—especially those who have
served long enough to know the preferences and practices of other circuit judges—will
calibrate their decision-making to avoid the risks of an en banc overruling. See Giles et al.,
Etiology, supra note 58, at 461 (“[J]udges in the minority on a circuit—given good
information about the preferences of the majority—modify their panel behavior in
response to avoid en banc rehearing.”).
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data indicate. At the same time, the frequency of partisan en banc
behavior seems to be mitigated by something else, and it is worth
unpacking what those forces could be.
We articulate three such forces pushing against the impulse to
weaponize en banc review pre-2018: first, collegiality concerns;
second, entrenched circuit en banc workarounds and customs; and
third, general rule of law and judicial independence norms. Understanding these forces is not just critical to speculating why our initial
hypothesis was thwarted, but also to understanding what is vulnerable
to change in the future.
A.

Norms of Collegiality

11/18/2021 14:12:20

167 Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1413
(2009); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. For this very reason, a consensus
model, including the cost of dissent in the judicial utility function, was a better predictor of
court of appeals decision-making than the standard model that focuses on preferred
outcomes. See Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of
Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 782 (2011).
168 For data on rates of dissent in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 27, at 264–65. For information on rates of en banc grants, see Sadinsky, supra note 6,
at 2015 n.128.
169 Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb, Prologue to JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS 1 (Sheldon
Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986).
170 Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1607
(2002).
171 Edwards, supra note 44, at 1645; see also Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast
and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 994 (1993)
(“You are in a different world when you put a robe on. It is something that just makes you
feel that you have got to do what is right, whether you want to or not.” (quoting Senator
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Perhaps the most obvious dynamic pushing against the en banc
partisan impulse is the pressure to get along with one’s colleagues.
Scholars agree that “conventional wisdom favors judicial consensus
and discourages dissent.”167 More than ninety-seven percent of federal court of appeals panel decisions are unanimous and less than one
percent of panel decisions are vacated and reconsidered en banc.168 To
reach consensus, judges engage in “a continual quest to reduce conflict through holding conferences, circulating draft opinions and memoranda, and conducting private meetings between individual judges or
groups of judges.”169 These substantial efforts are undermined by en
banc reversals and splits that fall on party lines.
Collegiality may be desirable for many reasons. Judges, for
example, may be motivated to do a “good job of judging.”170 For D.C.
Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, a collegial court is one where “judges
have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the
law right.”171 Collegiality thus “plays an important part in mitigating
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the role of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges
of differing perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen
to, and ultimately influence one another in constructive and lawabiding ways.”172
Judges also pursue collegiality for the simple reason that “appellate court decisions are inherently collective products”173 and, consequently, judges want to be held in high regard by their colleagues.
Specifically, judicial colleagues are “a true peer group, people who
share the same position and work in the same situation.”174 Perhaps
for this reason, D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald pointed to “the
respect of our fellow judges” as an important limit on judicial
discretion.175
All judges know that dissent comes at a price. “In all the courts of
appeal,” explained D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, “the judges
must value collegiality, if only because an individual circuit judge has
little authority when acting alone; any substantive decision requires
the concurrence of at least two judges.”176 Correspondingly, circuit
judges are repeat players with each other and, as such, “anticipated
future interactions” may be the driving force behind the norm of
consensus.177
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Strom Thurmond at Judge Kozinski’s investiture as Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Federal Claims in 1982)).
172 Edwards, supra note 44, at 1645. For Judge Edwards, empirical scholars go too far in
embracing models that suggest that judges are motivated principally by ideology at the
expense of collegiality and other legal principles. See id. at 1640–41 (claiming that
collegiality actually mitigates judges’ ideological preferences and enables them to find
common ground); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J.
1895, 1900 (2008) (presenting a comprehensive analysis of the flaws in such legal models).
For critiques of Judge Edwards’s view, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 54–63;
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates
About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 747–51 (2005).
173 BAUM, supra note 111, at 51; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How
Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb
in Securities Fraud Opinions, 52 EMORY L.J. 83, 108 (2002) (discussing the impact of
collegiality on opinion writing).
174 BAUM, supra note 111, at 54.
175 Patricia M. Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1984).
176 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, at 1016. Furthermore, as suggested by theories of
cognitive dissonance, court of appeals judges “seek to reduce the psychic discomforts of
standing alone.” HOWARD, supra note 7, at 193; see also Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in
American Courts, 43 J. POL. 412, 417–18, 427–29 (1981) (noting that judges desire
unanimity and seek to avoid dissent because of its potential to cause “interpersonal tension
and animosity” between them).
177 Rachel K. Hinkle, Michael J. Nelson & Morgan L.W. Hazelton, Deferring,
Deliberating, or Dodging Review: Explaining Counterjudge Success in the US Courts of
Appeals, 8 J.L. & CTS. 277, 282 (2020); see also Cross, supra note 167, at 1416 (tying dissent
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aversion to norms of reciprocity “such that a judge’s dissent from an opinion may cost him
votes in his future opinions”).
178 DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 17
(2002).
179 VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION
MAKING 112 (2007).
180 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 261.
181 See id. at 261–63 (discussing the costs of dissents).
182 Id. at 42.
183 Cross, supra note 167, at 1401; see also Giles et al., Setting a Judicial Agenda, supra
note 17, at 865 (agreeing with the contention that “legal goals have far greater operative
effect in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court” (quoting LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 88 (1997))).
184 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123 (1995).
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There are other costs to dissent as well. “Most people value leisure time, and there is little reason to think judges are different”;178
writing separate opinions takes “time and energy [and that] obviously
translates into less time for other activities.”179 In addition to the
“effort cost” of writing a dissent, there is a “collegiality cost” too.180
Dissenters may be less well-liked, in part, because judges in the
majority may resent criticism or may resent the extra workload of
answering the dissenter’s objections in their opinion.181 For nearly all
judges, it makes sense to avoid “the ill will of one’s judicial colleagues—wrangles with colleagues make for a harder job . . . .”182
Judges highly value collegiality, and they give it more than just lip
service. As others have demonstrated, federal court of appeals judges,
at least before the Trump era, were willing to trade off ideology for
other ends, including collegiality. A 2003 study by Frank Cross found
that “ideological preferences [were statistically significant but] not
overpowering. For all judges, ideology explained only a little over five
percent of the differing outcomes, leaving considerable room for other
influences.”183
Former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner provided an
extreme example of the willingness of court of appeals judges to forsake their preferred outcome in order to accommodate another panel
member. “[I]n a three judge panel,” Posner explained, if “one judge
has a strong opinion on the proper outcome of the case . . . the other
judges, if not terribly interested in the case, may simply cast their vote
with the opinionated judge.”184 Indeed, so long as one of the indifferent judges goes along, the other indifferent judge will likely go
along, rather than write a dissenting opinion.
Judge Posner refers to what others have called “panel effects,”
that is, the influence that each member of a circuit panel has on the
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other members.185 Numerous panel effect studies have been conducted,186 most considering the ideological diversity of panel members
and some considering the impact of race and gender diversity on a
panel decision.187 In particular, these studies link panel effects to the
high rates of unanimity on federal courts of appeals. “Liberal and conservative judges tend to vote differently in many areas of the law; if
they voted sincerely, in most cases we would not observe panel
effects—we would observe far more dissents.”188
Cass Sunstein, for example, found that a judge’s ideological tendency is likely to be dampened if she is sitting with two judges
appointed by a different political party and, correspondingly, that a
judge’s ideological tendency is likely to be amplified if she is sitting
with two judges appointed by the same political party.189 A striking
example of both dampening and amplification is affirmative action. A
Republican-appointed judge sitting on a panel with two Democratic
appointees is more likely to uphold affirmative action programs (sixtyfive percent of votes) than a Democrat-appointed judge sitting on a
panel with two Republican appointees (sixty-one percent).190 On all
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185 See Hinkle et al., supra note 177, at 277–79 (describing the phenomenon and
recounting its exploration by scholars); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial
Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 348–49 (2011) (analyzing the panel
effect). In addition to panel effects that result from the collegial environment, panel effects
may also result from strategic decision-making. See supra note 166 (discussing the
“whistleblower” theory of panel effects).
186 For a good summary, see FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS 148–77 (2007).
187 See generally Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S.
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 299 (2004) (assessing the impact of panels’ gender and race composition on decisionmaking dynamics); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (exploring
panel effects with respect to gender); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics,
Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231
(exploring panel effects with respect to race).
188 Deborah Beim & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Interplay of Ideological Diversity,
Dissents, and Discretionary Review in the Judicial Hierarchy: Evidence from Death Penalty
Cases, 76 J. POL. 1074, 1076 (2014).
189 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 8–13. The phenomenon of dampening or
amplifying is based on “group cohesion theory where a unified group of judges (that is,
three judges with the same political-ideological make-up) is more likely to make an
ideologically extreme unchecked decision than if the group had more ideological balance.”
Morgan Hazelton, Kristin E. Hickman & Emerson H. Tiller, Panel Effects in
Administrative Law: A Study of Rules, Standards, and Judicial Whistleblowing, 71 SMU L.
REV. 445, 447 (2018).
190 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 24–25. Sunstein uses political party affiliation
as a gauge of ideology, where Republican appointees are less liberal than Democratic
appointees; Sunstein separately measured the voting patterns of Democrat-appointed and
Republican-appointed judges and found clear evidence of a link between party affiliation
and ideology. See id. at 19–24, 113–22.
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191 See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 319 (2004).
192 Collegiality norms are also threatened in non-partisan en banc cases, as the en banc
process necessarily “involves reviewing and reversing one’s fellow circuit court judges.”
CROSS, supra note 186, at 108; see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 269–70 (noting
that en banc review takes a “heavy toll on collegiality,” for panel judges are “highly
sensitive to the rejection of their decisions by their colleagues,” likely more so than from
“strangers, such as the Justices of the Supreme Court”); Smith, supra note 17, at 134
(noting that en banc decisions “most clearly illustrate the issue cleavages” among circuit
judges).
193 Recall the Manning case in the Fourth Circuit and the tone of the opinions between
the dissent and majority. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
194 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 32, at 1021.
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Democrat-appointed panels, eighty-one percent of votes support
affirmative action programs; on all Republican-appointed panels,
thirty-four percent of votes support such programs.191
The willingness of court of appeals judges to trade off ideology
for other ends, demonstrated in the panel effects literature, among
other places, is very relevant to en banc decision-making. In particular, collegiality norms are an important backstop to majority-party
judges setting aside a minority-dominated panel ruling in order to put
in place the ideological preferences of the majority party.192 The alternative—separating judges into two partisan warring camps—would
fundamentally undermine collegiality norms.
The very nature of en banc review therefore raises the specter of
this kind of my-team-versus-your-team dynamic: It brings all of the
judges together, often presents them with a high-stakes controversy,
and risks lining them up in “teams.” Going en banc can bring out the
nastiness of judging and undermine the good manners that most
judges expect as routine.193 And while a judge on a panel may be
willing to find common ground with another panelist to avoid conflict,
the willingness of judges to trade off ideology for other ends is far
more complicated when the whole circuit is involved. Put simply, en
banc comes at a high cost—a tax on collegiality—and the judges are
aware of the price and not often willing to pay it.
Judges see the collegiality tax as more than just ruffled feathers.
D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg warned of the risk of undermining the panel system altogether for a system where panel members
would not seek to find common ground but, instead, would “stake out
an adventuresome position.”194 Judge Jon Newman of the Second
Circuit likewise spoke of en banc review as a “threat” to collegiality
and attributed the lack of vitriol in Second Circuit decisions to “the
infrequency of the occasions when we confront each other as members
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of an [e]n banc court.”195 Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit put
it this way:
The judges of a circuit not only share the same title, pay and terms
of office, but they also agree to follow the same judicial oath,
making them all equally susceptible to error and making it odd to
think of the delegation of decision-making authority to panels of
three as nothing more than an audition. Saving en banc review for
“the rarest of circumstances,” . . . thus “reflects a sound, collegial
attitude,” one worth following here.196

B.

Mini En Bancs and Other Work-Arounds

Most circuits have embraced these collegiality pressures by creating several institutionalized workarounds that serve to limit en banc
review. The variation they embody from circuit to circuit is fascinating
and is our subject for another day, but the point for this article is that
collectively they offer further explanation for the lack of en banc partisan behavior historically.
Most notably, nine of the thirteen circuits have adopted some
form of the “mini en banc” procedure.197 Mini en bancs are elusive
and have various pseudonyms including “junior en banc,” “informal
en banc,” and the “quasi en banc.”198 The Second Circuit has engaged
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195 Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review in the Second
Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 2016.
196 Colter Paulson, Judge Sutton Explains Why En Banc Review Is So Rare, SIXTH CIR.
APP. BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010) (quoting Mitts v. Bagley, 626 F.3d 366, 370 (2010)), https://
www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/judge-sutton-explains-why-en-bancreview-is-so-rare.
197 See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of
Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 715, 728 (2009)
(describing these circuits: the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, Tenth, and
the District of Columbia); Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, Mini in Banc
Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 544–57 (1985)
(providing an overview of the “mini en banc” procedure). The phrase “mini en banc” is
used multiple ways across the country and can sometimes generate confusion. It is used on
occasion to describe the en banc process in the Ninth Circuit, which is mini (or “limited”)
because it is a subset of all the active judges. Given that en banc rehearings are already
notorious for being time-consuming and unwieldy, it is perhaps no surprise that the Ninth
Circuit does not rehear en banc cases with the full circuit of twenty-nine judges. Instead,
the court uses what is known as a “limited” en banc, or sometimes a “mini” one. See
Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
317, 317 (2006). The “mini en banc” to which we refer is the kind used outside the Ninth
Circuit to avoid full en banc review, not the limited en banc routinely used in the Ninth.
198 Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 197, at 547 n.77; Sloan, supra note 197, at 715;
Solimine, supra note 17, at 36.
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199 See Sloan, supra note 197, at 730–31. Currently, it seems that the First, Second,
Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits are those that have most consistently used mini en bancs,
while the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have also used some type of mini en
banc on occasion. See id. at 726–30; Sadinsky, supra note 6, at 2025–27.
200 See Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 197, at 547–50.
201 See id.
202 Id. at 552, 555.
203 Michael S. Kanne, The “Non-Banc En Banc”: Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) and the Law
of the Circuit, 32 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 611, 611 (2008) (citing Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e)).
204 See id. at 614 (describing the likelihood that circulations infrequently result in
rehearings en banc); see also Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 197, at 557 (detailing the
extent to which mini en banc proceedings result in unanimous opinions, especially in
comparison to full en banc opinions). The D.C. Circuit has a similar policy whose authority
is referred to as the “Irons footnote.” Kanne, supra note 203, at 618. Aside from the
impulse to minimize divided en banc decisions, several other considerations merit
circulation of panel opinions to the entire court, including the need to spot intra-circuit
splits and the desire for the circuit to speak with one voice.
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in the practice since at least 1966, but the procedure is rarely documented and hard to define.199
Under the most familiar version of the mini en banc, pioneered
by the Second Circuit, the original three-judge panel circulates a draft
opinion to all judges on the entire circuit before an opinion is published tentatively suggesting that a precedent should be overruled.200
The judges then exchange memos or emails and the draft opinion may
be revised if the wind is blowing towards the possibility of an en banc
hearing; but if not, a circuit precedent can be overruled by a panel
decision on the (safe) assumption that en banc will be avoided.201 All
of this typically happens behind the scenes. The goal of the mini en
banc is to prevent a real en banc.
Even outside this version of the mini en banc, other circuits,
including the Fourth and Tenth, have a policy by which every draft
opinion is circulated to every judge on the circuit, and the Third circulates draft opinions to every active judge on the circuit.202 The
Seventh Circuit has a rule by which one panel can veer from circuit
precedent if the draft opinion has been circulated to all the judges
first.203 All of these circulating practices have many justifications,
surely, but one known consequence is the lack of divisive partisan en
banc decisions.204
Finally, many of the circuits share an unwritten practice and tradition of avoiding en bancs in the spirit of collegiality, and this circuitspecific custom is passed on from one generation of judges to the next.
The Second Circuit, for example, touts this tradition vocally: Judge
Robert Katzmann explained that the circuit has a “longstanding tradition of general deference to panel adjudication—a tradition which
holds whether or not the judges of the Court agree with the panel’s
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Sadinsky, supra note 6, at 2015.
Newman, supra note 8, at 382.
207 Id. at 384.
208 Martin, supra note 8, at 5.
209 Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District of Columbia
Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 517 (1986).
210 J. Bret Treier, Increased En Banc Activity by the Sixth Circuit, 19 TOL. L. REV. 277,
282 (1988) (“Although such a dynamic is present in any appellate court, the intensity is
heightened when the balance between majority and minority views is in a state of flux, as it
is currently with the Sixth Circuit.”); see also Harry W. Wellford, Anna M. Vescovo &
Lundy L. Boyd, Sixth Circuit En Banc Procedures and Recent Sharp Splits, 30 U. MEM. L.
REV. 479, 513 (2000) (“We can only hope that this tendency toward personal expression,
rather than judicial expression, may subside in the Sixth Circuit.”).
206
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disposition of the matter before it.”205 Judge Jon Newman has further
boasted that “[i]t is no coincidence that the Second Circuit, which has
the lowest rate of rehearings [e]n banc of all the circuits, is also the
most efficient circuit.”206 According to Judge Newman, “[d]espite the
occasions when each of us has read a panel opinion with which we
profoundly disagree, we have been able, to a remarkable degree, to
submerge our individual judicial convictions in the interest of the
proper functioning of our court.”207
One can almost see the “no I in team” on the back of the Second
Circuit’s judicial softball jersey. But these traditions bring more than
just warm words and bragging rights. These traditions have power—
power that is transformative and long-lasting. Before becoming a
judge, a person who was known for (or even selected because of)
party loyalty may feel pressure to acclimate to the traditions of the
new job and an obligation to carry on traditions of the circuit created
by her predecessors. Over time, her party loyalty may be supplemented and perhaps even replaced by a new kind of loyalty: membership in a different elite group with different pressures and cultures.
Once one becomes a member of “the Mighty Third,”208 as the Third
Circuit calls itself, one is expected to act like a member of the Mighty
Third.
Of course, these traditions are not infallible. Judge Patricia Wald
of the D.C. Circuit once explained that rapid personnel turnover on a
court can unwind resistance to en bancs: “The appointment of a new
majority of judges in a circuit in only a few years can strain that
accommodation. Under such circumstances, normal tensions
increase.”209 In the Sixth Circuit, for example—a circuit with a comparatively more robust en banc practice—a dramatic shift in personnel in the 80s and 90s was linked to “increased disagreement” and
decreased collegiality.210
But, despite their potential fragility, the sheer existence and
variety of these formal and informal mechanisms in the courts of
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appeals to avoid en banc review provides insight into our thwarted
hypothesis. Presumably en banc has been treated uniquely for decades
by courts of appeals judges—precisely because those judges are committed to avoiding conflict. As such, en banc review seems to have
developed a quasi and at least partial immunity from partisan
behavior.
C.

Norms of Judicial Independence

11/18/2021 14:12:20

211 See Neal Devins & Will Federspiel, The Supreme Court, Social Psychology, and
Group Formation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 2, at
85, 90.
212 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 36 (2008) (listing numerous goals of
judges, including “power, prestige, reputation, self-respect”).
213 BAUM, supra note 111, at 32–33.
214 See Liptak, supra note 4.
215 Id. (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
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Finally, perhaps the best explanation for resistance to en banc
partisan decision-making is the historic strength of judicial independence norms.
Federal court of appeals judges have multiple goals. As scholars
have demonstrated, ideology is certainly an important goal, but there
are others too.211 In particular, we believe federal court of appeals
judges care a great deal about the esteem in which they are held, especially in the professional and social networks that they inhabit.212
Accepting a federal judgeship typically means giving up future income
and agreeing to significant constraints on one’s personal activities;
those who find this tradeoff desirable are likely to care a great deal
about their reputation in the communities they value.213 And that
esteem is inextricably linked with norms of judicial independence.
Judicial independence at the very least means that judges are not
under the thumb of any political party or actor.
Consider, for example, the now notorious exchange between
Chief Justice Roberts and President Trump regarding the President
calling a federal district judge who ruled against him an “Obama
judge.”214 In the Chief Justice’s view, “[w]e do not have Obama judges
or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an
extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do
equal right to those appearing before them. That independent judiciary is something we should all be thankful for.”215 For the Chief
Justice to take on the President of the United States publicly like that
was nothing short of remarkable. Motivating him was the need to
defend an “independent judiciary”—a commitment that has been
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embraced by several Supreme Court Justices and federal court of
appeals judges, including President Trump’s appointees.216
This well-entrenched and widely-shared embrace of an independent judiciary is fundamental on several levels, all of which speak to
the costs of weaponizing en banc review in order to advance partisan,
ideological goals. First, as is often said, the judiciary’s power is tied to
its legitimacy and, as such, federal judges “must take care to speak and
act in ways that allow people to accept [their] decisions . . . as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures . . . .”217
As has been recognized by judicial leaders since the time of Chief
Justice John Marshall, if courts are merely pawns of politicians, then
courts lose their power and authority.218 Chief Justice John Roberts
spoke out to defend judicial independence because it is the central
nervous system of the federal courts. He, and every other federal
judge, regardless of the President who appointed her, is keenly aware
of this fact. It is this same impulse, we think, that counters the draw of
“my team-your team” thinking in en banc decision-making.
Closely related to judicial independence norms is a commitment
to the rule of law: “[T]here is perhaps no other norm that has a
stronger prima facie claim on judges than the norm that the decision
making of judges should be governed by a consideration of the relevant legal factors.”219 This commitment to the rule of law is “woven
tightly into the fabric of legal education and the legal profession.”220
Law-oriented decision-making cuts against ideological decision43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 29 Side B
11/18/2021 14:12:20

216 See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive, supra note 77, at 306 (describing how the
Justices’ “embrace of the norm of judicial independence” allows them to adopt ideological
positions contrary to those of their partisan constituencies); see also Bravin, supra note 1
(discussing frustration among federal judges, including now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett,
about the popular perception that they are “extensions of the presidents who appointed
them”); Richard L. Hasen, More and More Republican Officials Are Standing Up to Trump
and His Effort to Overturn the Election, SLATE (Dec. 1, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2020/12/republican-officials-who-have-gone-against-trump-barr-duceykemp.html (recounting the refusal of federal and state judges of all ideological inclinations
to maintain President Trump’s meritless election-related lawsuits).
217 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
218 See FALLON, supra note 3, at 45 (arguing that a judicial decision rendered on the
basis of “whim, caprice, or personal like or dislike for the parties” would lack legal and
moral legitimacy); Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma, supra note 3, at 2245–46 (describing the
ways in which the Supreme Court’s legitimacy turns on “the behavior of political actors”
and the ways in which that behavior can, in turn, “undermine the Court’s reputation”).
219 Martinek, supra note 2, at 77.
220 Id.
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making, including the formation of competing partisan ideological
blocs.221
Indeed, this norm is embedded in legal education and practice.
For example, a 2016 study comparing the general public to lawyers
and judges showed that legal training and experience furthers “impartial legal decisionmaking” by fixing a judge’s attention on “decisionrelevant features of a case.”222 By demonstrating that legal training
and experience inform professional judgment, this study underscores
the centrality of rule-of-law norms both to judges and to their social
and professional networks.223 Perhaps more telling, the refusal of
Republican-appointed judges—some appointed by President Trump—
to back the President’s unproven claims of a stolen election was a testament to the power of these norms.224
The flip side of this coin is the cost of the partisan weaponizing of
en banc review. When the dominant political party uses en banc
review to overturn a minority panel decision, the en banc decision
reinforces the popular belief, embraced by three-quarters of
Americans, that judges base decisions on their political views to a
great or moderate extent.225 This behavior cuts against the strong pull
of rule-of-law and judicial independence norms. Put another way, it
reinforces President Trump’s view of judging at the expense of Chief
Justice Roberts’s view. And that internal self-image warfare may be
the best explanation of what put the brakes on en banc partisan warfare . . . at least historically.
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221 In other words, like everyone else, federal court of appeals judges try to “project
images of themselves that are consistent with the norms in a particular social setting and
with the roles they occupy.” MARK R. LEARY, SELF-PRESENTATION: IMPRESSION
MANAGEMENT AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 67 (1996).
222 Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci &
Katherine Cheng, “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354–55 (2016).
223 See LEARY, supra note 221, at 67.
224 See Hasen, supra note 216 (describing the refusal of judges of both parties to lend
credence to President Trump’s meritless election-related lawsuits); John O. McGinnis,
Constitutional Fidelity, CITY J. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.city-journal.org/in-electionlawsuits-trump-judges-follow-the-law (arguing that Trump-appointed judges “have turned
out to be singularly uncooperative conspirators” in Trump’s efforts to put “democracy at
risk”).
225 KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING
OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE COURTS (2007), https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf.
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See supra Part II.
Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—And the
Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2020).
228 Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroythe-presidency/537921.
229 See infra notes 257–63 and accompanying text; see also Reid Wilson, States Sue
Trump Administration at Record Pace, HILL (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/
homenews/state-watch/482620-states-sue-trump-administration-at-record-pace (detailing
state lawsuits against President Trump and his administration).
227
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There is one last mystery on our plate. Not only did our data
surprise us by showing a lack of partisan behavior in en banc decisionmaking over time, but that immunity to partisanship appears to stop
or at least significantly erode in 2018. What explains the dramatic
increase in partisan splits and partisan reversals from 2018 to 2020?
We see two possibilities. Either we are now at an inflection point
where circuit judges see themselves as Democrats or Republicans and
partisan warfare en banc will become the norm. Or, the 2018 to 2020
data is an anomaly associated with President Trump, and anti-partisan
rule-of-law forces will once again come to dominate en banc decisionmaking. Both scenarios are possible, and each would have different
implications for en banc review going forward.
On the one hand, there certainly are warning signs that en banc
review has been weaponized and that this change is here to stay. As
we discussed in Part II, the partisan divide has widened, judicial confirmation politics is increasingly nasty and increasingly salient, and the
social and professional networks of judges are increasingly
balkanized.226
On the other hand, rather than represent a precursor of what lies
ahead, the Trump presidency may stand alone. In the view of many,
President Trump challenged “the basic norms and institutions of
democracy”227 and thereby “test[ed] the institution of the presidency
unlike any of his [forty-three] predecessors.”228 Correspondingly,
more than any administration before it, the Trump administration and
its opponents turned to the federal courts to advance their agenda.229
Federal judges are necessarily in the middle of bitterly partisan disputes involving presidential initiatives and the personal dealings of the
President. In administrations after President Trump’s, federal judges
may not be called into service in such overtly partisan disputes.
Indeed, then-candidate Joe Biden repeatedly spoke of “[t]he country
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[being] sick of the division,” “sick of the fighting,” and promised a
return to normalcy.230
Let us first consider the possibility that the Trump era is a harbinger of things to come. To start, President Trump tapped into
entrenched polarization. His election was “a symptom of polarization
rather than a cause of it.”231 Understanding “the intense hatred
among legions of Republican voters of liberal elites and of the socalled meritocracy,” Trump was “willing to go where no other presidential candidate would venture.”232 Specifically, by playing into the
identities, biases, and fears of large segments of the American
electorate, Trump intensified these trends, but he did not create
them.233
For this very reason, political scientists studying the Trump era
“are pessimistic about both the short- and long-term prospects for
amelioration of hostile partisan division.”234 During the COVID-19
pandemic, for example, “[r]ampant partisanship” was the largest
obstacle to social distancing, mask wearing, and other practices critical
to limiting the spread of the virus.235 Today, polarization is seen as
intractable because of the “alignment between other social identities
and partisanships.”236 More than during any other period, the
electorate has been “divided into two separate camps based on voters’
preference for key foundational moral principles and the policies that
derive from them . . . .”237
Most relevant to our project, President Trump tapped into and
accelerated a bitter fight between Democrats and Republicans
43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 31 Side A
11/18/2021 14:12:20

230 Ezra Klein, Joe Biden’s Promise: A Return to Normalcy, VOX (May 20, 2019, 8:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/20/18631452/joe-biden-2020presidential-announcement-speech.
231 Ashton Yount, Donald Trump’s Election Did Not Increase Political Polarization,
ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC’N (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.asc.upenn.edu/news-events/
news/trump-did-not-increase-polarization (quoting Professor Yphtach Lelkes).
232 Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Audacity of Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/opinion/trump-anger-fear.html.
233 See A LAN I. A BRAMOWITZ , T HE G REAT A LIGNMENT : R ACE , P ARTY
TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF DONALD TRUMP 170 (2018) (“Perhaps more than
any . . . major party candidate in the past sixty years, Donald Trump reinforced some of the
deepest social and cultural divisions within the American electorate.”).
234 Edsall, supra note 232.
235 Joshua Clinton, Jon Cohen, John S. Lapinski & Marc Trussler, Partisan Pandemic:
How Partisanship and Public Health Concerns Affect Individuals’ Social Mobility During
COVID-19, 7 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2021).
236 Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, How Could Human Nature Have Become This
Politicized?, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/opinion/
trump-politics-psychology.html (quoting political scientists Sean Westwood and Erik
Peterson).
237 Id.
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regarding judges.238 Unlike earlier presidential races, in which judicial
nominations were not particularly important to candidates or
voters,239 judicial vacancies, particularly the power to appoint a
Supreme Court Justice, were a key issue in the 2016 election.240 Thencandidate Trump boosted his electoral prospects by partnering with
the Federalist Society to release a list of potential Supreme Court
candidates.241
By capitalizing on longstanding trends regarding polarization and
judicial selection, President Trump’s election further elevated the salience of judicial appointments. In so doing, the link between party and
ideology became clearer. If the President’s party controls the Senate,
nominations will receive swift action and ultimate confirmation; if the
President’s party is in the minority, nominations will languish.242 This
type of winner-take-all politics may well outlast the Trump
administration.
Indeed, further buttressing this prediction is the fact that the
courts once again played a figural role in the 2020 election. President
Trump initially sought to rally his base with an updated list of possible
Supreme Court nominees;243 he likewise sought an electoral advantage by nominating Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court mere
weeks before Election Day.244 Then-candidate Joe Biden followed
238

See supra notes 133–43 and accompanying text.
Consider, for example, the 2004 presidential election. One week before the election,
then U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist announced that he underwent a
tracheotomy for thyroid cancer. David G. Savage, Chief Justice Has Thyroid Cancer, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2004), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-oct-26-narehnquist26-story.html. Neither John Kerry or George W. Bush, the major party
candidates in the 2004 presidential election, used that announcement to focus attention on
the Supreme Court. For voters, too, the Supreme Court was a low priority—only one
percent ranked the Supreme Court as the most important issue. Press Release, Pew Rsch.
Ctr., Moral Values: How Important? Voters Liked Campaign 2004, But Too Much ‘MudSlinging’ 15 (Nov. 11, 2004), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/public_opinion_and_polls/prcnov04postelectpdf.pdf.
240 See PEW RSCH. CTR., TOP VOTING ISSUES IN 2016 ELECTIONS 4 (2016), https://
www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election (reporting
that sixty-five percent of voters deemed Supreme Court appointments a “very important
factor” in their voting decision in the 2016 presidential election).
241 Alan Rappeport & Charlie Savage, Donald Trump Releases List of Possible Supreme
Court Picks, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/us/politics/
donald-trump-supreme-court-nominees.html; David Montgomery, Conquerors of the
Courts, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/
wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts.
242 See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text.
243 Eric Bradner, In Repeat of 2016 Strategy, Trump Pledges New List of Justices After
Two Stinging Supreme Court Losses, CNN (June 18, 2020, 6:28 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/06/18/politics/2020-election-trump-list-supreme-court/index.html.
244 See Nancy Cook & Gabby Orr, Trump Taps Barrett, Launching Brawl Over Supreme
Court’s Future, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/
239
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suit, initially promising to release a list of potential Supreme Court
nominees, and then promising that his first pick would be a Black
woman.245 More tellingly, proposals to add Justices to the Supreme
Court were suddenly in vogue after the September 2020 death of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and subsequent Barrett nomination.246
Judicial nominees, at least on the Supreme Court, are now explicitly told they are expected to advance the causes of the party that
backed them.247 That may have been true before President Trump, but
it is now conventional wisdom.248 The 2020 Democratic Party platform specifically called for “structural” changes to the federal courts,
including adding seats to the federal courts of appeals.249 The
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09/26/trump-scotus-coney-barrett-easy-choice-422019 (describing the potential boost in
support for Trump among evangelicals and Catholics, as well as the diversion from “more
negative headlines about issues potentially damaging to Trump,” as a result of Barrett’s
nomination).
245 Quint Forgey, Biden Says He’ll Release List of Black Women as Potential SCOTUS
Nominees, POLITICO (June 30, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/30/
biden-black-female-supreme-court-nominees-345622.
246 Astead W. Herndon & Maggie Astor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death Revives Talk of
Court Packing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/
politics/what-is-court-packing.html.
247 The most recent example of this development was President Trump’s public
statements, shortly before the 2020 election, that he wanted then-Judge Amy Coney
Barrett to join the Supreme Court as soon as possible in order for her to hear any disputes
that arose out of the election. Lawrence Hurley & Jeff Mason, Trump Celebrates at White
House as Supreme Court Nominee Confirmed, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2020, 6:09 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-barrett/trump-celebrates-at-white-house-assupreme-court-nominee-confirmed-idUSKBN27B143.
248 For an examination of how public and elected government perspectives of resultsoriented decision-making have created a legitimacy dilemma for the Supreme Court, see
FALLON, supra note 3, at 39–41 (naming Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as examples of decisions that many have criticized as
illegitimately political); Grove, Legitimacy Dilemma, supra note 3, at 2245 (discussing
pressure on the Justices “to sacrifice the legal legitimacy of their judicial decisions in order
to preserve the sociological legitimacy of the Court as a whole”).
249 Carl Hulse, Countering G.O.P. on Courts, Democrats Will Call for ‘Structural’
Change, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us/democratsjudiciary-reform.html; see also Leah Litman, Opinion, How to Fix the Supreme Court:
Expand the Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html (arguing that Congress should
exercise its power to expand the lower federal courts for the “health and well-being of our
constitutional democracy”). Following the election of Joe Biden, these calls continued. See
Madison Alder, Liberals Push Congress for ‘Robust’ Lower Court Expansion,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2020, 4:51 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
liberals-push-congress-for-robust-lower-court-expansion?context=search&index=1. Other
proposals include Democratic circuit judges taking senior status so that they can still hear
cases while paving the way for the Biden administration to appoint younger successors.
Zoe Tillman, Trump Transformed the Federal Courts. Here’s What Biden Could Do.,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 17, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
zoetillman/trump-judges-appoint-biden-courts; see also Marin K. Levy, The Promise of
Senior Judges, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2021) (advocating for active judges to take
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senior status to create new vacancies and expand the court’s capacity). For additional
discussion of Congress’s power to pursue ideological objectives through its control of the
lower courts, see John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of
the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39
J.L. & ECON. 435 (1996).
250 Flipping Circuit Courts, supra note 138.
251 On the D.C. Circuit, this practice dates back to the Obama years. After flipping the
D.C. Circuit, judicial appointees of President Obama backed Obama administration
requests for en banc review to vacate Republican-dominated panel decisions. See Jeffrey
Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief.
252 See id. (discussing Democrat-appointed judges taking control of the D.C. Circuit
after multiple appointments in 2013); Dolan, supra note 61 (discussing the Republican
transformation of the Ninth Circuit through the appointment of ten judges from 2018 to
2020).
253 Ruiz & Gebeloff, supra note 134.
254 See supra Section II.D.
255 The former head of the American Constitution Society, for example, has taken direct
aim at supposed Federalist Society political activism. See Fredrickson & Segall, supra note
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Republican Policy Committee (RPC) went so far as to formally
embrace partisan en banc overrulings. As stated by the RPC,
“[i]ncreasing the number of Republican-appointed circuit judges
increases the chances of Republican-appointed judges hearing a given
case. Flipping the court’s majority also increases the chances of conservative rulings in cases reheard by all the judges of that circuit—socalled en banc rehearings.”250 Needless to say, the spike in partisan en
banc overrulings suggests that court of appeals judges—both
Democrat-appointed and Republican-appointed—increasingly see en
banc review as a partisan tool.251 This seems particularly true of circuits in which multiple judges are confirmed at the same time,
including the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.252 More telling,
appointees of President Trump to the federal courts of appeals “were
nearly four times as likely to clash with colleagues appointed by
Democratic presidents as those appointed by Republicans,” around
double the rate of judges appointed by other Republican
presidents.253
Further suggesting that we are at an inflection point are recent
efforts to limit the power of the Federalist Society and the pushback
to those efforts by Republican court of appeals judges in general, and
Trump appointees in particular.254 As noted in Part II, the Federalist
Society now serves as the de facto screener and groomer of
Republican judicial nominees. The Society also serves as a critical
social and professional network for judges and would-be judges.
Future Republican administrations are likely to turn to the Society as
well; for their part, Democratic lawmakers and interest groups will
seek to limit the power and influence of the Society.255 Democratic
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141 (arguing that, contrary to statements on its website, the Federalist Society is “a
powerful and partisan organization that plays a large role in selecting federal judges who
will then reliably rule for Republican Party and conservative interests”). More
significantly, the Democratic Policy Committee issued a fifty-four page report in May 2020
regarding the role of the Federalist Society and dark money in reshaping the federal courts.
See DEBBIE STABENOW, CHUCK SCHUMER & SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, DEMOCRATIC
POL’Y & COMMC’NS COMM., CAPTURED COURTS: THE GOP’S BIG MONEY ASSAULT ON
THE CONSTITUTION, OUR INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2020).
256 Jess Bravin, Biden Aims to Appoint Liberal Judges After Trump’s Conservative Push,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-aims-to-appointliberal-judges-after-trumps-conservative-push-11606559402.

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 33 Side A

interest groups, too, are advocating that—starting immediately with
President Biden—Democratic Presidents steal a page from the
Republican playbook by giving greater emphasis to ideology in judicial appointments.256 This us-versus-them dynamic will further divide
federal court of appeals judges into competing camps of Democrats
and Republicans.
If we are indeed at an inflection point, en banc review deserves a
critical evaluation. To the extent the en banc process becomes
weaponized as a matter of course, it also becomes a threat to an
independent judiciary. At the very least, this merits a conversation on
reform. Perhaps en banc should be limited to intra-circuit conflicts?
Perhaps en bancs should be subject to a super-majority requirement?
Perhaps we are comfortable with en bancs being used to discipline
judges from the minority party and thus no change is necessary? In
any event, if this is the new normal, the costs and value of en bancs
should be reassessed.
Of course, the other explanation for the spike in partisan en
bancs is also a genuine possibility. There are ways in which the Trump
presidency is sui generis, such that the spike in partisan en banc
decision-making may prove to be tied more to President Trump himself, and not to broader Democrat-Republican differences. In
answering the question of whether collegiality and judicial independence norms will survive the Trump presidency, our focus thus far has
been on ways in which President Trump capitalized on longstanding
trends in the nation at large and in the Republican Party. But legal
disputes may occupy a uniquely preferred position in President
Trump’s orbit.
President Trump used the courts to advance his administration’s
goals as well as his personal interests—and his opponents used the
courts to combat him. As Peter Baker reported in 2019, “[a]lways
litigious in private business, [Trump] has brought his penchant for the
legal process to the presidency as he regularly threatens to sue perceived adversaries, unlike most of his predecessors—although it gen-
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erally results in more talk than tort, since he routinely fails to follow
through.”257 For Shannen Coffin, former counsel to Vice President
Dick Cheney, President Trump was more willing than other Presidents
to fight the opposition in court.258
And, in his rhetoric, President Trump has often combined talk of
positive outcomes for himself with the need for conservative judges
who will be faithful to the Constitution.259 In his failed effort to overturn the 2020 election in several swing states, President Trump filed
more than fifty lawsuits and spoke of his hopes that Republicanappointed judges would back his unsubstantiated claims of voter
fraud.260
Beyond his own legal filings, President Trump was a magnet for
lawsuits and prosecutors.261 For example, by November 2020, states
had filed 138 separate lawsuits against the Trump administration
(around thirty-five per year).262 By comparison, states filed seventyeight multi-state suits in the eight years of President Obama’s administration (around ten per year), and seventy-six multi-state suits
during President George W. Bush’s eight years in office (also around
ten per year).263
This means our recent data may be picking up differences on the
docket as opposed to differences on the bench. A comparison of 2018
to 2020 Trump-era en banc decisions with en banc decision-making
during the Obama and George W. Bush administrations suggests that
the Trump docket is different than earlier administrations. In partic-
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257 Peter Baker, Trump Is Fighting So Many Legal Battles, It’s Hard to Keep Track, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/politics/donald-trumplawsuits-investigations.html.
258 Id.
259 See id. (describing President Trump’s rhetoric that the liberal judiciary, which had
ruled against him in numerous lawsuits, was undertaking an assault on the Constitution).
260 Pete Williams & Nicole Via y Rada, Trump’s Election Fight Includes Over 50
Lawsuits. It’s Not Going Well., NBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020, 9:06 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/trump-s-election-fight-includes-over-30-lawsuitsit-s-n1248289; Michelle Lee, Trump Says He Is Counting on the Supreme Court to Settle
Disputes over Mail-in Ballots, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2020, 10:47 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2020/09/29/presidential-debate-live-updates/#linkP2LX2W45Q5BSLKTRU4BYQ6CRK4 (describing President Trump’s quip that he was
counting on the Supreme Court, including his not-yet-confirmed nominee Amy Coney
Barrett, “to look at the ballots”).
261 Baker, supra note 257 (quoting Michael Waldman, president of the Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University School of Law).
262 Erik Ortiz, State AG Lawsuits Against Trump Continue to Mount, Far More Than in
Recent Years, YAHOO NEWS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/news/state-ags-suedtrump-admin-103036490.html; see also Wilson, supra note 229 (describing data indicating
that states filed 103 multi-state lawsuits against the Trump administration in its first three
years). Ninety-six of these lawsuits were led by Democratic Attorneys General. Id.
263 Wilson, supra note 229.
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ular, the Trump docket had far more cases directly involving the
President or his signature policy initiatives.264
We identified 120 en banc decisions dating from 2018 to 2020.
Among those, nineteen cases (sixteen percent) involve President
Trump or his most controversial policies: eleven are immigrationrelated, two involve executive privilege, two involve emoluments, two
involve abortion through federal Title X funding, one involves financial deregulation, and one involves a new oil pipeline.265 In another
eighteen cases (fifteen percent), courts of appeals used en banc review
for ideologically polarized issues;266 in twenty-eight cases (twentythree percent), the federal government was a party.267
For the sake of comparison, in 2016 under the Obama administration, there were forty-seven en banc decisions in our database.268
Unlike under President Trump, there were no cases that involved
either President Obama directly or major policy initiatives pursued by
the Obama administration.269 Eleven (twenty-three percent) involved
politically charged issues;270 in another eleven cases (twenty-three
percent), the federal government was a party.271 For the George W.
Bush administration, we reviewed forty-one en banc decisions in
2008.272 No case involved President Bush directly and only two cases
(five percent) involved major policy initiatives associated with the war
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264 We compared the en banc docket of the Trump era (2018 to 2020) to the en banc
docket of the final year of both the Bush and Obama presidencies. Recognizing that this
comparison is not comprehensive, our focus was to see whether the Trump docket was
fundamentally and unequivocally different—so much so that partisanship during the
Trump-era could be linked to differences between the Trump-era docket and the dockets
of earlier presidents. For reasons detailed in the next two paragraphs, we think the
differences are indeed that stark.
265 See Memorandum from Brandon Goldstein to Neal Devins and Allison Orr Larsen,
En Banc Review Under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump
(on file with author) [hereinafter Goldstein Memorandum].
266 Five of these cases involve excessive use of force by police and qualified immunity,
four involve discrimination in the workplace, two involve new Ohio state abortion laws,
one involves an EPA deregulation policy, one involves voting procedures in Arizona, and
one involves a First Amendment challenge to a federal campaign finance law. The fifteenth
case involves Florida’s “pay-to-vote” scheme for newly released felons, and was granted an
initial en banc hearing on appeal. See id.
267 See id.
268 We chose 2016 because it was the last year of the Obama administration, so
President Obama’s influence on judicial selections at that time would be at its apex.
269 See Goldstein Memorandum, supra note 265.
270 Three cases involved the Second Amendment, three involved elections and voting
laws, three involved immigration, one involved a state death sentence, and one involved
police use of force. See id.
271 See id.
272 As with selecting 2016 for President Obama, we chose 2008 for George W. Bush’s
administration because it was the last year of his presidency, so President Bush’s influence
on judicial selections at that time would be at its apex.
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on terror.273 Three cases involved politically charged issues (seven
percent);274 the federal government was a party in fourteen cases
(thirty-four percent).275
To summarize: For both Presidents Bush and Obama, no en banc
decision directly involved the President and next to no en banc decisions involved the signature policy initiatives (at least during the final
year of their administrations); but for President Trump, the President
and his signature policy initiatives were regularly subject to en banc
review.276
No doubt, en banc review in the age of President Trump was fundamentally different. Those differences may become the new normal
or, instead, may reveal that the Trump era was an outlier. Without a
crystal ball, the ultimate fate of rule-of-law norms and the potential
weaponizing of en banc review remains to be seen.
One thing we know for sure, though: 2018 to 2020 was a period of
time marked by the erosion of well-entrenched norms of judicial independence and collegiality. Whatever the explanation, the current
spike in en banc review should at least serve as a warning of the fragility of those norms and the need to nurture and protect non-partisan
norms in the future.
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See Goldstein Memorandum, supra note 265.
The politically charged cases included two cases about abortion and one about
elections and voting laws. See id.
275 See id.
276 State lawsuits against Presidents Trump, Obama, and George W. Bush tell a similar
story. President Trump and his most visible policy initiatives were the subject of thirty-four
lawsuits per year; Obama and Bush were subject to ten per year. See supra notes 257–64.
Earlier administrations were subject to even fewer state lawsuits. See PAUL NOLETTE,
FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 20–21 (2015) (discussing data on state lawsuits since 1980).
274

43660-nyu_96-5 Sheet No. 34 Side B

Going en banc involves a complex mix of ideology, rule-of-law
and collegiality concerns. By taking the long view of en banc decisions
across time and circuits, this Article has reached the surprising and
important conclusion that rule of law and judicial independence
norms have played a significant role in mitigating the partisan
weaponizing of en banc review. Data from 1966 to 2017 strongly suggest that forces beyond ideology and party loyalty affect en banc judicial decision-making. In particular, during the very period where party
polarization took hold of the judicial nomination and confirmation
process, en banc decision-making remained stable. There was no
meaningful change in the rates of partisan splits or partisan reversals.
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Data from 2018 to 2020, however, underscore that we could be in
a season of change. There are significant red flags to indicate that
longstanding rule-of-law and collegiality norms on the federal bench
are eroding and there may come a day when en banc review is purely
seen as a numbers game for one party to use against the other. Recent
Republican and Democratic Party efforts to “flip” control of and
“restructure” the circuits further suggest that the political branches
will push federal courts of appeals to advance partisan goals by
trading off rule-of-law norms.
These calls for weaponizing en banc review and the dramatic
spike in partisan en banc decision-making raise basic questions both
about the desirability of en banc review and the legitimacy of the federal courts of appeals. Partisan overrulings come at a substantial cost,
chipping away at the very rule-of-law norms that underlie the threejudge panel system and en banc review. Indeed, partisan en banc
review reinforces a destructive “us versus them” mentality and, consequently, may well spill over to the decision-making of three-judge
panels and other interactions between court of appeals judges.
Time will soon tell whether the Trump era is an inflection point or
an aberration. And while the future is a cliffhanger, this Article also
highlights the importance of the past. By answering the question
whether historically en banc has been used as a partisan tool with a
resounding no, this Article demonstrates the heretofore durability of
rule-of-law norms. Consequently, before assuming that the Trump era
is the new normal, we should first allow the dust of the Trump presidency to settle. Only then will we know if en banc is ultimately the
story of the triumph or the demise of the rule of law.
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